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The South African Constitution states that in order to promote the achievement of equality, 
legislative and other measures designed to protect those disadvantaged by unfair discrimination 
may be taken. One of these measures is affirmative action. For the constitutionality of measures 
in disputes the Court has opted for the ‘rationality’ standard of judicial review. 
This dissertation aims to critically analyse the rationality standard in the judicial defense of 
affirmative action measures through an examination of court cases and government legislation. 
It was found, firstly, that the role of rationality in the Constitution value structure as a whole is 
superficially confined to the legitimacy of governmental purpose. Its result excludes the full 
spectrum of competing interests and a determination of their relative weight in terms of an 
integrative account of the Constitution structure. Secondly, it was found that promoting the 
achievement of equality has proved to be problematic within the strictures of a rationality 
standard. 
It is concluded that to promote the achievement of equality requires a judicial review during 
affirmative action disputes to have regard to the impact of measures in their implementation 
within the ambit of right and value to equality. Legal standards are supposed to provide the 
basis to choose amongst varying competing ends or relate them in a meaningful way to an 
integrating normative standard in order to claim democratic justificatory and legitimizing 
value. The rationality standard needs to be amended to introduce a more substantive normative 
standard which ensures that the implementation of measures which passes constitutional 
muster also takes into account how it may affect other constitutional rights and values. The 
proportionality standard provides the degree of democratic accountability expected of rights- 
limiting measures by considering the impact which such measures may have on competing 





CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH 
 
1.1. The background of the study 
 
‘The Constitutional Court has contextualised its interpretation of the affirmative action clause of 
the Constitution in a manner which dogmatically isolated it from the broader normative 
framework of the equality guarantee and the Constitution as a whole. In the context of equality 
challenges to affirmative action, the Court opted to extract the constitutional conditions for 
validity from s 9(2) exclusively, to the exclusion of the fairness and proportionality requirements 
of ss 9(3) and 36 respectively. This approach, if consistently followed, stands to limit basic 
constitutional values and could undermine the ability of the Constitution to meaningfully 
integrate competing interests, in the context of affirmative action disputes, in a comprehensive 
and fair manner. An element of ambivalence, however, characterises the Court’s jurisprudence 
in this respect, which might serve to open the way for the development of a more integrated, 
fairness-based approach.’1 
The expression of equality and unfair discrimination is a fundamental proxy of the 
Constitution. Its meaning is profound.2  The drafters of the Constitution were at pains to 
communicate the ideal concepts of equality in the South African context and its achievement 
against the background of the systemic inequality which had taken place in South Africa.3  It is 
against this background that affirmative action was incorporated in the Bill of Rights, which is 
the cornerstone of the Constitution.4  Affirmative action allows for preferential treatment of 
formerly disadvantaged groups of people.5  It requires a member of the disadvantaged group to 
be preferred for the distribution of a benefit over a person who is not a member of that group.6 
Further, while the basis for affirmative action is usually race or gender, these are not the only 
determining factors.  Efficiency is an inherent element, with the Employment Equity Act7 
(EEA) requiring the appointment of persons that are suitably qualified.8 Section 9 (2) of the 
 
 
1 JL Pretorius “Fairness in transformation. A critique of the Constitutional Court’s affirmative action    
     jurisprudence” (2010) 26 SAJHR 536 at 570. 
2 See for example Minster of Finance v Van Heerden [2004] BCLR 1125 (CC) (Van Heerden) 14 par 22; Bato 
  Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (7) BCLR 687    
  (CC). Para 74 in Brink v Kitshoff NO1996 (4) SA 197 (CC); 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (CC): “[a]s in other national   
 constitutions, section 8 is the product of our own particular history. Perhaps more than any of the other   
 provisions in chap 3, its interpretation must be based on the specific language of section 8, as well as our own  
 constitutional context. Our history is of particular relevance to the concept of equality.” 
3 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 106 of 1996 section 9(1) (2). 
4 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook 4 ed (Juta and Co, Cape Town 2001) 223 par 3-4: Segregation and  
 apartheid created a political and economic system that favoured some people and unfairly discriminated  
  against others. This system left a legacy of inequality which inhibits the enjoyment and exercise of the  
  constitutional rights of a large number of people of South Africa. 
5 Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013 (EEAA) s. 2: The purpose of the Act is the implementation   
  of affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in employment experienced by designated groups,   
   in order to ensure their equitable representation in all occupational levels in the workforce. 
6 Section 13 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) (1). 
7 Act 55 of 1998. 
8 Section 1 of the EEA (note 6 above); See for example: Section 7 (a) of Act 47 of 2013 EEAA note 5.   





Constitution states that ‘equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms’ and that ‘to promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures 
designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by 
unfair  discrimination may be taken.’9  Thus, affirmative action is understood as a means to 
achieve equality in its substantive or restitutionary sense.10  To determine the legitimacy 
of  affirmative action measures, the Constitutional Court in Minister of Finance v Van 
Heerden 11 opted for the ‘rationality’ standard of judicial review.  The Court stated that the 
test whether a restitutionary measure falls within the ambit of section 9(2) is threefold.  The 
measure must: 
‘(a) target a particular class of people who have been susceptible to unfair discrimination; 
(b) be designed to protect or advance those classes of persons; and 
(c) promote the achievement of equality.’12 
 
The threefold test is a benchmark determinable in terms of the rationality standard. 
 
1.2. Problem statement 
The main challenge facing the Constitutional Court in adjudicating affirmative action disputes 
is reconciling the compelling need for transformative justice with the core function of the 
Constitution to integrate, in a fair and proportional manner, the diversity of rights and interests 
at stake.13  The constitutional goal is a ‘more equal and fair society that hopefully is non-racial, 
non-sexist and socially inclusive.’14  Accordingly, ‘measures that are directed at remedying past 
discrimination must be formulated with due care not to invade unduly the dignity of all 
concerned.’15  Furthermore, measures should not result in the abuse of power or ‘impose 
such substantial and undue harm on those excluded from its benefits that our long-term 
constitutional goal would be threatened.’16 
However, the rationality standard of constitutional review does not enhance the courts’ capacity 





   groups have equal employment opportunities and are equitably represented in all occupational levels in the    
 workforce of a designated employer. 
9 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 106 of 1996 section 9(2). 
10 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (Juta and Co, Cape Town 2005) 264 par 3. 
11 [2004] BCLR 1125 (CC) (Van Heerden). 
12 Ibid par 37. 
13JL Pretorius (note 1 above) 569 par 2. 
14 South African Police Service v Solidarity abo Barnard 2014 (6) SA 123 (CC) (Barnard) 18 par 30. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Van Heerden (note 2 above) par. 44. 
17 JL Pretorius “Deliberative democracy and constitutionalism: the limits of rationality review:” (2014) 29   





standard treats affirmative action measures as a means to an end and self-justifying.18  This 
implied assumption was revived by the Constitutional Court in the South African Police Service 
v Solidarity abo Barnard19 case when it affirmed the Van Heerden adjudication that, ‘if 
restitutionary measures, even based on any of the grounds of discrimination listed in section 
9(3), pass muster under section 9(2), they cannot be presumed to be unfairly discriminatory,’20 
and ‘to hold otherwise would mean that the scheme of section 9 is internally inconsistent or 
that the provisions of section 9(2) are a mere interpretative aid or even surplusage.’21  The 
court in Van Heerden was adamant that it should not be thought that the ‘Constitution 
at once authorises measures aimed at redress of past inequality and disadvantage but also 
labels them as presumptively unfair.’22 
Be that as it may, the third condition for s 9(2) compliance, that is, whether the measure 
‘promotes the achievement of equality’, has proved to be problematic within the strictures of a 
rationality mould.23  In assessing therefore whether a measure will in the long term promote 
equality, it is required that the constitutional goal must be kept in mind.24  Therefore, this 
dissertation will argue in favor of the view that ‘of all the standards employed by the courts for 
the purpose of constitutional review (such as rationality, reasonableness, fairness, 
proportionality), a deferential rationality standard is problematic in this respect.’25  This is 
because it can lead to a narrow instrumentalist perspective for the evaluation of governmental 
objectives, which is incapable of facilitating substantive forms of democratic control, that is, 
participation, inclusivity, openness, transparency, public justification and accountability.26 
1.3. Research questions 
 
The following questions will be considered in this dissertation 
 
Given that affirmative action measures are integral to the attainment of equality and that the 







18 JL Pretorius (note 17 above) 420 par 1. 
19 2014 (6) SA 123 (CC) (Barnard) (note 14 above). 
20 Van Heerden (CC) (note 2 above) 21 par 2. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 JL Pretorius (note 1 above). 
24 Van Heerden (note 2 above) par 44. 






1. Does the rationality standard adequately address the need for transformative justice in 
keeping with the core function of the Constitution to integrate, in a fair and proportional 
manner, the diversity of rights and interests at stake? 
2. Is the rationality standard effective in promoting the realisation of the constitutional 
goal of a non-racial, non-sexist and socially inclusive, in which each person will be 
recognised and treated as a human being of equal worth and dignity’? 
3. Does the rationality standard adequately facilitate claims of unfair discrimination by 
those affected by such measures during the adjudication of affirmative action dispute? 
4. Of all the substantive standards of constitutional review, which is the most appropriate 
standard in determining disputes regarding affirmative action measures? 
1.4. Literature Review 
 
Affirmative action is a widely researched topic and cannot be exhaustively covered in this 
dissertation.  This literature review focuses on the views of Pretorius and Klinck,27 Du Plessis 
and Corder,28 De Waal and Currie,29 Rautenbach30 , Malan,31 and Pretorius.32 
The controversial features of affirmative action measures appear from the literature to be 
related to a need for a suitable normative standard of judicial review which would have regard 
to the goals of affirmative action measures and legitimately adjudicate claims of unfair 
discrimination brought by those impacted by such measures. Pretorius and Klink argue that the 
fairness standard should form part of the substantive equality which underlies section 9 as a 
whole.33  They state that ‘unfair or unreasonably disproportional forms of affirmative action 
would be irreconcilable with realising the long-term ideal of equality based on the affirmation 
of equal worth and respect.’34  They also note that underlying constitutional values of non- 
racialism and non-sexism do not allow section 9(2) to be interpreted in a way ‘which says: 




27JL Pretorius and ME Klinck Labour law Employment Equity Law, http://www.mylexisnexis.co.za/Index.aspx 
   Last Updated: August 2014 - SI 14. 
28 Du Plessis and Corder “Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights” (Juta and Co, Cape Town     
 1994) 144-5. 
29 De Waal (note 4 above) 223-5. 
30 C Rautenbach “Employment Equity Act (and other myths about the pursuit of equality, equity and dignity in   
     the post-apartheid South Africa)” 4th edition of 2015 PER eISSN 1727-3781 http://www.nwu.ac.za/p-   
 per/index.html 30 January 2015. 
31 K Malan “Constitutional perspectives on the judgments of the Labour Appeal Court and the Supreme Court of   
     Appeal in Solidarity (acting on behalf of Barnard) v South African Police Services”. 2014 De Jure 118 
32 JL Pretorius (note 17 above). 






speakers) is designed to advance the disadvantaged, the former can be treated in an abusive or 
oppressive way that offends their dignity and tells them and the world that they are of lesser 
worth than the disadvantaged’35 Given that affirmative action measure must promote equality,36 
Pretorius and Klink argue that ‘ignoring the fairness of the impact of remedial measures would 
indeed have rendered meaningless the ideal of achieving equality.’37  They add that ‘it is a 
natural consequence of the relational or comparative aspect inherent in all equality analyses 
that the fairness of the impact of differentiating measures on affected parties be evaluated.’38 
Remedial measures correlate to normative legitimacy or fairness.  Despite this, fairness as 
a practical test is not an established standard for affirmative action measures. 
The impact of measures is touched on by Moseneke J in Van Heerden, where it was held that 
they should not constitute the abuse of power and cause undue harm.39  There are three 
conditions for section 9 (2) compliance.  The first condition is that the measure must target 
a particular class of people who have been susceptible to unfair discrimination; and the 
second condition is that the measure should be designed to protect or advance those classes of 
persons.  However, the third condition, to ‘promote the achievement of equality’ in 
order to pass constitutional muster imports considerations that go beyond rationality testing.40 
This condition requires a judgement to have regard to the impact of measures in their 
implementation - within the ambit of right and value to equality.41  It needs to be considered 
‘whether the measure serves to advance or retard the equal enjoyment in practice of the 
rights and freedoms that are promised by the Constitution but have not already been 
achieved.’ 42 
This dissertation affirms that where measures have ‘manifestly overbalanced in ignoring or 
trampling on the interests of members of the advantaged section of the community, and 
gratuitously and flagrantly imposes disproportionate burdens on them, the courts have a duty 
to interfere.’43  Further, it is argued that some degree of proportionality, based on the particular 






35 JL Pretorius (note 1 above). 
36 JL Pretorius and ME Klinck (note 27 above) 9.3.3-4. 
37 Ibid 9.3.4 par 3. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Van Heerden (note 2 above) par at 44. 
40 JL Pretorius (note 1 above) 562 par 2. 
41 Van der Westhuizen J (note 14 above) 80 par 75. 
42 Sachs J’s judgment (note 2 above) para 142. 
43 Van Heerden (note 2 above) par 44; see for example: JL Pretorius (note 1 above). 





Thus, this dissertation will argue that the rationality standard needs to be amended to introduce 
a more substantive normative standard which ensures that the implementation of measure 
which ‘passes constitutional muster has also take into account how it may affect other 
constitutional rights and values.’45  This dissertation agrees with the sentiments that ‘no legal 
good is pursued in a space devoid of competing interests and nothing in the Constitution 
suggests that the validity of affirmative action should be judged in terms of its own objectives 
only.’46  Further, it is hardly contestable that the fairness of a measure cannot be established 
without consideration of the validity and weight of competing factors and interests.  
However, whether fairness is a suitable standard of review for affirmative action 
measures will be determined by a critical analysis of the rationality and proportionality 
standards of review. 
The separation of section 9(2) and 9(3) of the equality clause has created a dilemma.47 Malan 
questions whether measures for restitutionary equality grounded in section 9(2), which 
differentiate on one of the listed grounds of section 9(3) read with section 9(5), are to be 
considered on the same footing as other forms of racial differentiation.48  This implies that these 
restitutionary equality measures will be overtly and unfairly discriminatory, unless the author 
of the measures proves the contrary.49  He questions further whether restitutionary measures, 
in pursuance of section 9(2), should be treated differently from other forms of differentiation, 
and more particularly whether they should not be regarded as prima facie discriminatory.50  
In Barnard, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) considered measures on the same footing 
as other forms of racial differentiation and thus unfairly discriminatory.  Malan states that the 
SCA might have been wrong in applying the fairness test but, for the reason that measures 
cannot be self-justifying, the SCA was not wrong.51 
However, the SCA decision in Barnard was overturned by the Constitutional Court, which 
upheld the decision of the Labour Appeal Court (LAC), upholding the rationality standard. The 
decision of the Constitutional Court in Van Heerden was the first case to entrench rationality 
as a judicial standard of the review for affirmative action measures.52  The establishment of an 
internal test for section 9 (2) and Moseneke J’s behest to read section 9 provision as a whole 
 
 
45 Van der Westhuizen J (note 14 above) 84 par 83. 
46 JL Pretorius and ME Klinck (note 27 above) 9.3.4 par 3. 
47 Ibid par 4. 
48 Malan (note 31 above) 138 par 1 and 2. 
49 Ibid at 138 par 2. 
50 Ibid par 3. 
51 Ibid 138 par 4-5. ‘Measures have to be scrutinised in order to establish, with reference to the relevant  
 evidence, whether they are in fact truly measures that promote equality for all.’ 





are irreconcilable for many judges and academics who try to understand the exposition of the 
rationality standard and its correlation to the ‘intra-textual’ reading of the equality right.53   The 
court opted not to align its approach to section 9(2) of the equality clause with its standard 
unfair discrimination jurisprudence.54 
Du Plessis and Corder focus on the underlying bases that underpin Moseneke J’s adjudication 
in Van Heerden.  They note that section 8(2) (hereafter section 9(3)) prohibits 
unfair discrimination on the listed grounds.55  They state that by so doing section 8(2) 
strengthens the entrenchment of equality before the law and equal protection of the law in 
section (8).56  Section 8(3) includes ‘measures designed to achieve the adequate protection 
and advancement of persons or groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination, in order to enable their full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.’57 
Section 8(3) is read in the context of section 8 of the equality clause as a whole.58  Du Plessis 
and Corder state that section 8(3) (a) limits section 8(2) ‘by authorising distinctions, for the 
purpose of affirmative action, which can otherwise be regarded as unfair discrimination 
proscribed by section 8(2).’59  This dissertation argues against the approach held by 
Moseneke J, that section 9(2) limits section 9 (3). It argues that the effect of such 
interpretation and the endorsement of the rationality standard has denied accountability of 
government with regards to the implementation of such measures. 
Pretorius and Klink argue that ‘the Harksen test for unfair discrimination does not necessarily 
imply strict scrutiny of section 9(2) remedial or restitutionary measures.’60 They argue that this 
test certainly ‘does not imply a single rigid standard in terms of which the fairness or 
justifiability of a breach of the non-discrimination principle is measured in all circumstances.’61  






53 C Rautenbach (note 30 above) 4 -5 par 1. 
54 JL Pretorius (note 1 above) 536-570 1. 
55 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 s 8(2), see for example section 9(3) (note 9  
 above). 
56 Du Plessis and Corder (note 28 above) 126. 
57Section 8(3) of the Constitution (note 54 above). 
58 Du Plessis and Corder (note 28 above) 129 par 4; section 8(3) (note 54 above). 
59 Ibid; JL Pretorius (note 1 above) 538.at 1With respect to the relationship between affirmative action and the  
 right against unfair discrimination in particular, O’Regan J appears to have expressed the obiter opinion,  
   without elaborating, that a differentiating measure which falls within the ambit of s 8(3) (a) of the interim  
    Constitution is not susceptible to an unfair discrimination challenge under s 8(2).11. 






circumstances that are taken into account when the fairness or justifiability of a discriminatory 
measure is appraised.’62 
The rationality standard facilitates ‘the measure of deference paid towards state actors involved 
in drafting and implementing affirmative measures and such is out of line with the more general 
standard of review set by the drafters of the Constitution,’ and as contained in section 36 of the 
Bill of Rights.63  It will be argued that the rationality standard is incapable of adjudicating 
fairness of measures in the terrain of competing factors and interests, and thus is inefficient as 
a standard of review.64 
This study will further analyse the rationality standard as a proxy of constitutional review 
against conceptual coherence of constitutional democracy.65  Democracy and constitutionalism 
are two distinct models constituent of constitutional democracy.  These models emerge 
from two dialectal angles.  Thus, firstly they are famous for their internal disconnection 
when interpreted against a background of a dialectical understanding of the historical forces 
that gave birth to the Constitution.66  Secondly, with regard to the legitimacy of democracy, 
justification (public justification) is an essential element of democracy, amongst other 
values of participation, inclusivity, openness, and transparency.67  It is through public 
justification within deliberative democracy that the reconciliation of democracy and 
constitutionalism could be facilitated. 
This dissertation evaluates the rationality principle as being ‘conceptualized and applied as a 
standard of constitutional review of legislation and in illustration, other governmental action 
will be discussed, with the emphasis on that standard’s potential in facilitating democratic 
legitimation in particular contexts.’68  It will argue for a standard that would adequately address 




62 JL Pretorius and ME Klinck (note 27above) 9.3.4 par 7. 
63 Rautenbach (note 30 above) 4; Pretorius, J L “Accountability, contextualisation and the standard of judicial   
 review of affirmative action: Solidarity obo Barnard v South African Police Services” (2013) 130 SA Law  
   Journal 38 
64 See for example: JL Pretorius (note 1 above) 553 par 3 circumstances.101 “Instrumentalist deference typically  
 absolutises specific socio-political goals and disconnects them from their historically contingent and  
    contextually relative settings. Such an approach flies in the face of the fact that in reality no social good is  
    pursued in a space devoid of competing interests and to treat them as such would be tantamount to judging  
   the constitutionality of measures designed to promote such goods in terms of their own stated objectives only.  
    This would of course result in no meaningful constitutional scrutiny at all, since such measures would in  
  effect be constitutionally self- justifying.” 
65 JL Pretorius (note 17 above). 
66 Ibid 410 par 1. 
67 Ibid 417 par 2. 





fair and proportional manner, the diversity of rights and interests at stake in the review of 
affirmative action measures.  Thus, the study will argue in favor of the proportionality 
standard.69 Support for the proportionality standard is premised on the section 36 
limitation clause, which requires courts to be the custodians of an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom and to subject rights limiting 
measures to conform to these principles regarding both their purpose and effect.70 
Unsurprisingly, the jurisprudence of affirmative action is a reflective of disjunctions and 
opposing judgments since the entrenchment of rationality as a judicial standard of the review. 
 
1.5. Chapter outline 
 
Chapter 1 provides the context for the research by considering the interpretation of affirmative 
action measures in the context of the Constitution as whole, which is entrenched by the 
normative rationality standard as a standard of constitutional review. 
Chapter 2 examines the social and historical context, that is, the political and sociological 
background to affirmative action arising out of South Africa’s history of colonialism, slavery, 
patriarchy and apartheid. 
Chapter 3 examines the constitutional framework for the legal development of affirmative 
action.  This examination is carried out against the background of the concept of equality 
and the understanding that, in a broader sense, equality goes beyond mere formal equality and 
non- discrimination or identical treatment. 
Chapter 4 comprises the core of this dissertation and it critically evaluates the rationality 
standard of constitutional review for affirmative action measures against the background of 
unfair discrimination and the effect of the interpretation on the normative unity of the 
Constitution as a whole.  This chapter set out the limits of the rationality standard and 
argues that it is ill suited as a standard of review for affirmative action measures. 
Chapter 5 provides an argument in favor of the proportionality standard using the matter of 
South African Police Service v Solidarity abo Barnard 2014 (6) SA 123 (CC) as an illustration. 




69 JL Pretorius (note 1 above) 553 par 3. “If, as is claimed, the fairness investigation is devoted to the   
    complainant’s perspective, then the justification inquiry under s 36 would still remain to perform the ‘counter-    
 balancing’ role of adjusting the scales in favour of assigning the remedial objective its constitutionally  
    endorsed due weight.” 





integrative judicial standard of review that results in an interpretation that facilitates the 
normative unity of the Constitution as a whole. 
Chapter 6 contrasts normative fairness, the proportionality standard and the rationality standard 
against the background of searching for a ‘normative unity of the Constitution to optimise the 
realisation-potential of all competing constitutionally recognised goods.’71 


























































This chapter focuses on the social and historical context, that is, the political and sociological 
background to affirmative action arising out of South Africa’s history of ‘colonialism, slavery, 
patriarchy and apartheid.’72  Based on this context, the South African Constitution embraces the 
concept of equality that affirms remedial or restitutionary measures in order to promote the 
achievement of equality.73  The Constitutional Court in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister 
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others74 noted that 
‘South Africa is a country in transition. It is a transition from a society based on inequality to a 
one based on equality. This transition was introduced by the interim Constitution, which was 
designed to create a new order based on equality in which there is equality between men and 
women and people of all races so that all citizens should be able to enjoy and exercise their 
fundamental rights and freedoms. This commitment to the transformation of our society was 
affirmed and reinforced in 1997, when the Constitution came into force.’ 75 
The Constitution states that in order to promote the achievement of equality, legislative and 
other measures must be taken.76  These legislative measures are crafted to promote the 
achievement of equality by protecting and advancing persons or categories of persons who 
were previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.77  The EEA78 makes provision for 
affirmative action measures.79  Affirmative action measures are defined in the EEA as 
‘measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified people from designated groups have 
equal opportunities and are equitably represented across all occupational levels in the 
workforce of a designated employer.’ 80 
The sociological and political history, which ‘reveals a history of colonization, slavery, 
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action.’81  Systematic racism and sexism against the black majority and women, through 
legislation, resulted in systemic and structural discrimination against a black majority, other 
non-white minorities and woman in South Africa.82  Subsequent to independence from the 
British, a series of segregation laws were introduced. 83  These laws, such as ‘civilised labour 
policy’ sought to distinguish “civilized’ white and ‘uncivilized” black labour with the intention 
of protecting poor, white labour. 84 
2.1.2.  Equality gains support 
In July 1977, the Government of South Africa established a commission, 85 chaired by Professor 
NE Wiehahn, which introduced the first major changes in the South African workplace towards 
attaining equality.86  The Wiehahn Commission was formed solely to address the ‘changing 
needs of the times’87 and as a result, it investigated the labour dispensation.  The reason for this 
focus was expressed as follows: 
‘It took as points of departure the use of the labour field in South Africa as the conflict area for 
the acquisition of social, political and other rights for the workers of the country and the fact that 
changes in labours laws would have a ripple effect on other spheres of society. It viewed change 
over a broader front in society as essential’ 88 
Promotions and the granting of more favourable terms and conditions of employment premised 
on preferences of immutable attributes of race, colour and sex were prevalent.89 
Industrial courts thus, to counteract all discriminating practices, introduced the concept of 
unfair labour practice encompassing unfair discrimination.90 
2.2. The International Framework 
 
During this time South Africa was in the global spotlight for its repressive policies due to the 
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Organisations (ILO) and United Nations (UN).91 A Special Report of the ILO by the Director 
General considered action to be taken against South Africa,92 noting specific concerns over 
widespread unrest, fundamental instability, worsening economic prospects, in particular for the 
Black population of South Africa, and absence of progress towards the peaceful ending of 
apartheid in South Africa.93 
The United Nations instituted a programme of action against apartheid in South Africa, barring 
South Africa from trade in relation to importing and exporting goods and further subjecting it 
to economic sanctions.94 
2.3. South African Law Commission 
 
In response to these measures the South African government instructed the South African Law 
Commission 95 ‘to investigate the definition and the protection of group rights and the possible 
extension of the (then) existing protection of individual rights.’96  This exercise was to be 
executed in the context of the South African dispensation and the commission was required to 
ascertain the role that could be played by the courts towards the definition and protection of 
group rights.97 
The Commission recommended that “all rights should be protected in the Bills of Rights and 
ought to, among other things, ‘contain the right to equality before the law (non- 
discrimination).’ 98  In response the South African government announced that it would 
follow these recommendations and thus accepted the protection of individual rights in the 
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The South African Law Commission in its Interim Report 100 included a draft of a Bill of Rights 
and a clause on non-discrimination and affirmative action, affirming the rationale of both 
formal and substantive equality.101  The Interim Report provided a clause as follows that: 
‘(b) To this end the highest legislative body may by legislation of general force and effects 
introduce such programmes of affirmative action and vote such funds therefore as may 
reasonably be necessary to ensure that through education and training, financing 
programmes and employment, all citizens have equal opportunities for developing and 
realising their natural talents and potential to the full.’ 102 
The South African Law Commission’s Final Report echoed the view that the Bill of Rights 
ought to contain an equality clause103 with provision for non-discrimination104 and affirmative 
action.105  The non-discrimination clause and affirmative action clause was included in section 
8 in the Interim Constitution106 which prevailed in the final Constitution as section 9, the 
equality clause.  The Final Report noted that the issue of affirmative action remained 
controversial and subject to debate.107  The Commission’s Final Report acknowledged that 
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights emanated from and functioned in a society 
overwhelmed with enormous imbalances, deep-rooted differences and a legacy of serious 
injustice and social unrest. 108  Furthermore the Final report acknowledges that South 
African society had never had a justifiable Bill of Rights 109 and that the courts had never 
had a substantive testing of rights.  Thus, the laws of the legislature will be reviewed and 
annulled on the objective basis of general, moral and ethical norms or rights of the individual 
rights. 110 
2.4. Summation of findings 
 
This chapter has looked at the political and sociological background to affirmative action that 
has demonstrated the profound inequality arising from South Africa’s history of colonialism, 
slavery, patriarchy and apartheid. 
In addition the chapter has considered the international framework of the development of 
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against its repression policies and violation of human rights and as a result the South African 
Commission was established.  This Commission was responsible for the Reports that 
resulted in the inclusion of a draft Bill of Rights which included an equality clause affirming a 
provision for non-discrimination and the concept of affirmative action.  Affirmative action is 
regarded as an effective way of promoting the principle of equality of opportunities in 
societies where inequality is evident.111  It serves to favour individuals so as to dispense 
with historical disparities, but may however, amount to reverse discrimination if certain 
conditions are not adhered to or complied with.112  It is for this particular reason that 
courts are bestowed with testing powers to interrogate whether the measure is a legitimate 
restitutionary measure to promote the achievement of equality.113  The following chapter 
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CHAPTER 3: THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY 
 
3.1. Chapter outline 
 
This chapter focuses on the constitutional framework for the legal development of affirmative 
action against the background of the concept of equality and the understanding that, in a broader 
sense, equality goes beyond mere formal equality and non-discrimination or identical 
treatment. 
It should be noted that the Constitution of South Africa is the supreme law of the land.114  In 
its preamble, it recognises the injustice of the past and strives to heal the divisions of the past 
and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human 
rights; improve equality of life of all citizens and the free potential of each person. 115 
This Constitution is constituent of the founding provisions which state that South Africa is a 
sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: Human dignity, the achievement 
of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.116 
3.2. Equality 
 
3.2.1. The right to equality 
 
The right to equality forms an inherent part of the Bill of Rights and it is contained in sections 
9 (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5).  The Bill of Rights ‘is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa 
and enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom.’117  The state is required to respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
the rights in the Bill of Rights.  Nonetheless the ‘rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to 
the limitations contained or referred to in section 36, or elsewhere in the Bill.’ 118 
Section 9 (1) provides that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection 
and benefits of the law.119  However, due to the social and historical context against which 
equality is founded, section 9 (1) provides few answers to remedy the inequality that exists in 
South African society. Section 9 (2) expands the guarantee of equality, and states that equality 
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achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons 
or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.’ 120 
This chapter focuses on the provisions of section 9(1) and (2) of the Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution.  The remaining subsections will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
3.2.2. The concept of equality 
 
In Van Heerden the Court (Judge Moseneke) noted that the achievement of equality goes to 
the bedrock of constitutional architecture.121  The court noted that the preamble of the 
Constitution depicts the commitment of the Constitution and illustrates that the Constitution 
took effect when South African society was deeply unequal and uncaring of human worth.122 
Stark social and economic disparities will persist for a long time to come. 123  The Constitution 
does not only herald equal protection of the law and non –discrimination, but also the start of 
a credible and mandatory process of reparation for past exclusion, dispossession, and 
indignity.124 
Moseneke J alluded to the fact that the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court assertively 
states that the proper reach of equality is determined by making reference to the history of 
South African society and the underlying values of the Constitution.125  He articulated that the 
object of the Constitution is the ‘creation of a non-racial and non-sexist egalitarian society 
underpinned by human dignity, the rule of law, a democratic ethos and human rights, [and] 
goes beyond formal equality and mere non-discrimination which requires identical 
treatment’126 
Moseneke J made reference to the case of Bato Star Fishing, in which Ngcobo J stated that: 
 
‘The achievement of equality is one of the fundamental goals that we have fashioned for 
ourselves in the Constitution. Our constitutional order is committed to the transformation of our 
society from a grossly unequal society to one “in which there is equality between men and women 
and people of all races in this fundamental way, our Constitution differs from other constitutions 
which assume that all are equal and in so doing simply entrench existing inequalities. Our 
Constitution recognises that decades of systematic racial discrimination entrenched by the 
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result. We are required to do more than that.  The effects of discrimination may 
continue indefinitely unless there is a commitment to end it.’127 
The foregoing quotation elucidates the Constitution’s commitment to transformation in 
section 9 (2) of the Bill of Rights. 
3.2.3. Restitutionary measures 
 
In Van Heerden, Moseneke J emphasised the need for a comprehensive understanding of the 
concept of equality and stated that a harmonious reading of the provisions of Section 9 is 
required. 128  The court referred to section 9 (1), and subsection (3) and stated that the latter 
provision proscribes unfair discrimination by the state against anyone on the listed grounds and 
that section 9 (5) states that discrimination on the listed grounds is unfair unless fairness is 
established. 129 
The court emphatically stated that in essence section 9 (2) ‘provides for the achievement of full 
and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedom’ and sanctioned legislation and other measures 
designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination. 130 
In the context of section 9 (2) the Constitutional Court understood that restitutionary measures, 
sometimes referred to as affirmative action, may be taken to promote the achievement of 
equality.131  Moseneke J made reference to National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
and Another v Minister of Justice and Another 132 in order to explore the constitutional 
understanding of equality. 
In National Coalition, Ackerman J underscored measures to be “remedial or restitutionary 
equality.”133  Moseneke J elucidated that ‘such measures are not in themselves a deviation or 
invasive of the right to equality guaranteed by the constitution’134 nor are they “reverse 
discrimination” or “positive discrimination”. 135  Instead he held that such measures are an 
integral part of attaining equality. He stated further that the provisions of section 9 (1) and 
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to ensure ‘full and equal enjoyment of all rights’.  He cautioned against a ‘disjunctive 
or oppositional reading of the two subsections,’136 that, ‘would frustrate the foundational 
equality objective of the Constitution and its broader social justice imperatives.’137 
Moseneke J stated that the Constitution especially ‘ section 9, read as a whole, embraces for 
good reason a substantive conception of equality inclusive of measures to redress existing 
inequality.’  He showed that, absent ‘a positive commitment progressively to eradicate 
socially constructed barriers to equality and to root out systematic or institutionalised under-
privilege, the constitutional promise of equality before the law and its equal protection and 
benefit must, in the context of our country, ring hollow.’138  This affirms that the 
Constitution espouses the substantive conception of equality. 
3.2.4. Formal equality 
Formal equality means sameness of treatment, that is, the law must treat individuals in the same 
circumstances alike.139  The concept provides that attributes such as race, colour, and gender do 
not warrant treating people differently.140  Accordingly, it requires that all persons are equal 
bearers of rights.  Accordingly, ‘inequality is an aberration that can be eliminated by extending 
the same rights and entitlements to all in accordance with the same ‘neutral’ norm or standard 
of measurement.’ 141 
Formal equality does not take cognisance of actual social and economic disparities between 
groups and individuals.142  The failure of formal equality to take into consideration profound 
divisions in a society, vast inequality and the disregarding of human worth will certainly leave 
these social and economic disparities unchanged.  Formal equality only heralds negative action 
which is equal protection and non-discrimination, for the preservation of equality.143  The 
incapability of formal equality to acknowledge the circumstances of the individual and the 
failure to provide for the positive duty of reparation means that formal equality falls short of 
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3.2.5. Substantive equality 
 
Substantive equality is designed to eradicate socio-economic inequalities and the structures 
that bring them about. 145  Social inequality is defined as a situation where a person is 
excluded because of his or her social identity.146  Economic inequality is defined as ‘[the 
unequal access to, and distribution of basic needs, opportunities and material resources.’ 147  It 
is depicted in the employment law by underrepresentation in the workplace that signifies that 
there is an unequal distribution of resources. 
Substantive equality was developed to address the failings of formal equality.148  It ‘requires the 
law to ensure equality of outcome and is prepared to tolerate disparity of treatment to achieve 
this goal.’ 149  It takes into account actual social and economic disparities of groups and 
individuals in order to determine whether its constitutional commitment to equality is being 
upheld.150  In Bata Star Fishing Ngcobo J stated that transformation is a process.151  As a 
result, he then noted that ‘there are profound difficulties that will be confronted in giving 
effect to the constitutional commitment of achieving equality.’152  He cautioned against 
underestimating these difficulties and noted that ‘measures that bring about transformation 
will inevitably affect some members of the society adversely, particularly those coming 
from the previously advantaged communities.’153  Moreover, he added that ‘it may well be 
that other considerations may have to yield in favour of achieving the goal we fashioned for 
ourselves in the Constitution.  What is required, though, is that the process of 
transformation must be carried out in accordance with the Constitution.’ 154 
The Constitutional Court in President of South Africa v Hugo 155 emphasised the importance of 
a good understanding of the notion of unfair discrimination aligned to the concept of non- 
identical treatment to achieve equality. 
The concept of unfair discrimination will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. The notion 
of substantive equality adheres to the equality of the outcomes.  This approach strives towards 
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equality and was crafted as the result of an understanding that identical treatment does not 
amount to an equal position.156 
3.2.6. Affirmative action measures and unfair discrimination 
 
The court in Brink v Kitshoff NO157 held that its endorsement of substantive equality implied 
that affirmative action cannot be perceived as an exception to equality.158 
When the doctrine of equality was adopted in section 8 of the Bill of Rights in the Interim 
Constitution, it was against the consideration that discrimination against people who are 
members of disfavoured groups can lead to patterns of group disadvantage and harm.159 
Accordingly, it was made clear that such discrimination is unfair in that it facilitates and 
entrenches inequality amongst different groups in society.160 
The new constitutional order commits to the creation of a society which affords each human 
being equal treatment on the basis of equal worth and freedom.161  In Hugo Goldstone J 
emphasized the importance of a concept of unfair discrimination which recognizes that, 
whereas the ultimate goal is the creation of a society which affords each human being equal 
treatment on the basis of equal worth and freedom, ‘such a society cannot be achieved through 
the insistence upon identical treatment in all circumstances.’162  The court implicitly set out that 
each case, therefore, requires ‘a careful and thorough understanding of the impact of the 
discriminatory action upon the particular people concerned to determine whether its overall 
impact is one which furthers the constitutional goal of equality or not.  A classification which 
is unfair in one context may not necessarily be unfair in a different context.’163 
Ackermann J in National Coalition reflected on such concepts of equality and how affirmative 
action measures envisaged in section 8(3) (a) of the interim Constitution and 9(2) of the 
Constitution relate to the notion of equality. He ‘pointed out that past unfair discrimination 
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a mere prospective prohibition of discrimination.’164  Thus it is evident that both Constitutions 
have recognised the need for restitutionary or remedial measures. 
3.3. The legislation 
 
The EEA aims at providing employment equity, and was enacted to give effect to the promotion 
of the constitutional right of equality and the exercise of true democracy. 165  It is further evident 
from the purpose of the EEA that, amongst other things, it seeks to ensure the implementation 
of affirmative action. 166 Section 6 (2) provides that affirmative action is a defence against 
claims of discrimination. 
3.4. Summation of findings 
 
This chapter has dealt with the concept of equality and the understanding that in a broader sense 
equality goes beyond mere formal equality and non-discrimination or identical treatment.  
This chapter reveals that the status quo of ‘social and economic disparities’ that are prevalent 
in SA will continue unabated in the absence of restitutionary measures.  It is for that 
reason that “remedial or restitutional measures” in the form of affirmative action are 
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CHAPTER 4: THE RATIONALITY STANDARD AND COMPETING INTEREST 
AND VALUES IN THE CONSTITUTION 
‘No members of a racial group should be made to feel that they are not deserving of equal ‘concern, 
respect and consideration’ and that the law is likely to be used against them more harshly than others 
who belong to other race groups.’167 
4.1. Outline 
 
This chapter critically evaluates the rationality standard as a standard of constitutional review 
for affirmative action measures - against the background of unfair discrimination and the effect 
of the interpretation on the normative unity of the Constitution as a whole.  This chapter 
sets out the limits of the rationality standard and argues that it is ill suited as a standard of 
review for affirmative action measures. 
4.1.1. The tenets of statutory prohibition of unfair discrimination 
 
The previous chapter dealt with the constitutional framework to the legal development of 
affirmative action, as well as section 9(1) and (2) of the equality clause.  This chapter examines 
the remaining subsections of section 9, being section 9(3), (4) and (5) of the Constitution. 
Moseneke J in Van Heerden argued that a ‘comprehensive understanding of the Constitution’s 
conception of equality requires a harmonious reading of the provisions of section 9.’168 
However, Rautenbach notes that inconsistency has been evidenced in the application of the 
provisions of section 9 when dealing with the compliance of affirmative action measures.  
He states ‘that the exposition of the rationality standard of review based on section 9(2)’s 
internal test for compliance of an affirmative action measure would appear to follow a 
different approach.’169  Rautenbach states that the clear text of the equality rights embraces a 
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Further, this chapter critically evaluates the ability of a rationality standard of review to wrestle 
with complex competing interests, rights and values, which are at the heart of the constitutional 
democracy, and the constitutional goal which is at stake.170 
4.2. The correlation between differentiation and discrimination 
 
4.2.1. Mere differentiation 
 
It is important for an understanding of unfair discrimination to examine two important concepts 
- that of differentiation and discrimination.  The Constitution affirms the notion of formal and 
substantive equality and hence does not prevent the government from making classifications 
and from treating some people differently to others.  Accordingly, a complementary reading 
of subsections 9(1) and (2) of the Bill of Rights does not require everyone to be treated the 
same.171 The government may as a result classify persons and treat those persons differently 
to others for a variety of legitimate reasons.172  In terms of the EEA a “designated employer 
must, in order to achieve employment equity, implement affirmative action measures for 
people from designated groups.”173  A classical interpretation of differentiation is articulated 
as follows: 
‘It is impossible to regulate the affairs of the inhabitants of a country without differentiation and 
without classification that treat people differently and that impact on people differently. Not very 
differentiation can therefore amount to unequal treatment. If it did, the courts could be called on 
to review almost the entire legislative programme. Accordingly, it is necessary to identify the 
criteria that separate legitimate differentiation from constitutionally impermissible 
differentiation.’ 174 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and any law or conduct inconsistent with 
it is invalid. Its paramount feature is that the obligations it imposes must be fulfilled.175  The 
Constitution differentiates between a legitimate and impermissible differentiation by setting 
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its core, section 9(3) sets out the listed grounds upon which differentiation is impermissible 
and constitutes unfair discrimination.177  In addition to the listed grounds there are also 
analogous grounds for discrimination.178  However, the difference between listed and analogous 
grounds is in the discharge of the evidentiary burden which applies.  Differentiation is 
permissible if it does not amount to unfair discrimination.179 
4.2.2. Rule of law 
 
With regard to the concept of permissible differentiation, in Prinsloo v Van der Linde 180 the 
court stated that this differentiation for descriptive purposes must be referred to as ‘mere 
differentiation.’  In this regard the constitutional state is urged to act in a rational manner 181 and 
is called upon to correlate its action to a defensible vision of the public good and to serve to 
enhance the cohesiveness and the integrity of the legislation 182  Before it can be alleged that 
mere differentiation infringes section 9, the first step is to ascertain that there is no rational 
connection between the differentiation in question183 and the governmental purpose which is 
intended by it.184  If there is no rational connection the differentiation would infringe section 9, 
that is, the right to equality.185  In having met the requirements, differentiation may still amount 
to unfair discrimination.186  It is apparent from the concept of section 9 (1) that rationality is 
limited to differentiation.187  Accordingly, this limitation has prompted the Constitutional Court 
to develop the general rationality requirement, derived from the rule of law in section 1 of the 
Constitution.188 
With regard to the general rationality requirement, in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of SA, In ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa The Constitutional 
Court, 189 the court held that in terms of the rule of law that all exercise of public power by the 
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the purpose for which the power was given, otherwise they are in effect arbitrary and 
inconsistent with this requirement.’191  This approach forbids arbitrariness in general and is not 
limited to arbitrary differentiation.192  The remarkable feature of this jurisprudence is its 
articulation that once law or conduct has been found to be rational or irrational for the purpose 
of the general rationality requirement, it becomes unnecessary to have regard to whether there 
is a violation of section 9 (1) of the Constitution. 
This jurisprudence is adopted by courts in scrutinising compliance of affirmative action 
measures, and gives legitimacy to the crafting of affirmative action measures in the new 
constitutional order, where the government’s purpose is to protect and advance persons, or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.  According to the 
rationality standard of review, the implementation of affirmative action measures must 
be rationally correlated to the purpose which they were designed to achieve.193  However, it 
ought to be noted that ‘constitutionally, the ‘vision of the public good’ cannot be limited to 
a particular public purpose and the ‘coherence’ or ‘integrity’ of particular governmental 
aims is evidently not determinable by means of self-reference only.’194 
The critique of this standard reveals that it involves a simple analytical exercise and such cannot 
be counted.195  This is because there is indeterminacy about the kind and degree of reflective 
evaluation this standard allows regarding the ends of governmental action, if any.196  This 
standard evaluation does not avoid treating government purposes as ends to themselves and 
essentially self-legitimising.197 
Further, with regard to the evaluation of government ends in relation to other competing ends, 
the standard has no normative orientation to provide for weighting and reconciling competing 
ends.198  It treats government purposes as given and ends in themselves, and thus in practice the 
whole principle of inquiry is limited to the question of the utility of the means.199  In 
recapitulating the utility of the means it is focused in the narrow context of a self-standing 
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interfere with the decision of a public power if it considers such was exercised 
inappropriately.200 Accordingly, this approach undermines the fundamental constitutional 
principle.201 
In addition, the constitutional jurisprudence shows that, based on this principle, courts avoid 
their function and role. Rautenbach notes that the ‘[courts] must not primarily pursue policies 
deemed to advance or secure an economic, political or social situation for the benefit of all. 
That is the distinctive terrain of the legislature and the executive.’202  Rautenbach makes the 
point that the ‘rationality standard of review as articulated by Moseneke J in Van Heerden pays 
an inappropriate measure of deference in respect of the formulation of affirmative policies and 
measures.’203  It ‘is not directed at testing whether legislation or executive action is fair, 
reasonable or appropriate.’204  Accordingly,  ‘the rationality standard implies  deference or 
restraint on the part of courts towards the legislature and the executive, which is grounded in 
the principle of separation of powers.’205 
4.3. The implications of a rationality standard of review 
 
The rationality standard of review indicates the courts’ reluctance to presume that provisions 
on the Constitution operate in tension. As a result, courts have overlooked the impact of one 
right on other in specific situations and have interpreted rights narrowly at the outset to avoid 
possible tension.206 Van der Westhuizen J in Barnard, which is the leading Constitutional 
Court case in terms of affirmative action measures, notes that constitutional provisions 
inclusive of protecting rights ought to be construed in the context of the Constitution as a 
whole.207 Accordingly, ‘construing constitutional provisions in the light of the Constitution as 
a whole is a necessary corollary of the contextual and purposive approach to constitutional 
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the normative unity or the ‘internal value coherence’ of the Constitution.’209  Thus neither 
provision must be construed in isolation nor rights protected and enforced without regard to 
other rights. Van der Westhuizen J certainly stated that the exercise of the one constitutional 
right may have to be balanced against the other.210 
Van der Westhuizen J correctly states that the inherent question, whether the implementation 
of affirmative action measures passes constitutional muster, needs to take into account the 
promotion of equality and how the implementation may affect other constitutional rights and 
values.211  He proposes a separate inquiry, one which does not use only equality as a barometer, 
but which will also test the impact of the implementation.212  He states that the proportionality 
analysis, while not only the appropriate standard, is often well-placed for navigating the 
contested terrain of competing rights and values.213  It is a good step in a right direction to 
look for a barometer that is case sensitive and forms a concrete assessment of the competing 
rights.214  This is because a right should not be compromised more than necessary, taking 
into account the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom which the 
government has positive duties to promote and uphold.215 
It is imperative for courts to scrutinise the implementation of measures which may impact on 
any number of rights and interests, both of the individual right concerned and of the public.  
Each case would have to be determined on its own facts.  With regard to dignity as one of 
the founding values, Van der Westhuizen J states that affirmative action measures 
legitimately emphasise the relative importance of a particular characteristic of a 
candidate over other elements: ‘their implementation has the potential to affect the right to 
human dignity of people, individually or as members of a group.’ 216  He makes reference to 
the EEA that promotes equal dignity and respect of all people. In Van Heerden, Moseneke J 
concedes that the imposition of substantial and undue harm on those excluded from 
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However, dignity will not always be affected by the implementation of measures. Courts ought 
to remain aware that rights to and values of equality and dignity are interdependent and 
complementary.  Be that as it may, ‘but they may sometimes compete, as far as the scope 
of their implementation or enforcement is concerned.’218  As a result, while ‘aspects of 
one persons’ dignity may sometimes have to yield to the importance of promoting the full 
equality our Constitution envisages’,219 at other times, ‘the impact of equality-driven 
measures with laudable aims may not be justifiable in view of severe damage to human 
dignity.’220 
There are two factors that should be considered in order to assess the reasonableness and 
justifiability of the impact of such measures, namely, whether an aggrieved person was treated 
as a means to achieve an end and whether the decision reduces the aggrieved person to a 
member of an underclass to the extent that this person’s place in society and in the Constitution 
is denigrated.  Van der Westhuizen J eloquently states that ‘the perception of this may threaten 
the pursuit of our constitutional goal of a society in which everyone, regardless of their 
differences, is equally valued and at home.’221 
The second factor pertains to the question of whether the measure’s implementation amounts 
to an absolute barrier to the person’s advancement, and Van der Westhuizen J states in this 
regard that ‘if a measure is used to obliterate a person’s chances at progressing in her chosen 
career, it would not pass constitutional muster.’222  He states that it would constitute an 
impermissible barrier to an individual’s ability to “develop humanity, and ‘humanness’ to the 
full extent of its potential.223 
4.4. Fairness Standard: Grounds for Discrimination 
 
4.4.1. Impermissible discrimination 
Currie and de Wall state that discrimination ‘without departing from the meaning 
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two categories.225 The first is differentiation on listed grounds; this differentiation is found in 
section 9 (3) of the Constitution, which states the following: 
‘The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth’226 
When the differentiation takes place on listed grounds, discrimination will be established.227  
If the differentiation amounts to discrimination, it is logical to ask whether it amounts to 
unfair discrimination.228  The unfair discrimination will be presumed if discrimination is 
on listed grounds.  The onus of proof will shift to the alleged perpetrator to justify the 
unfair discrimination and, if the alleged discrimination took place in the workplace by the 
employer, the employer could raise the inherent requirement of the job as a defence or 
justification.229 This presumption is evident from section 9(5) of the Constitution, which 
stipulates that ‘discrimination on one more of the grounds listed in subsection 9 (3) is 
unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair’230 
Rautenbach refers to the foregoing analysis as the clear text of equality right, and the standard 
of review to be fairness.231  On the contrary, Moseneke J in Van Heerden states that ‘if 
restitutionary measures, even based on any of the grounds of discrimination listed in section 
9(3), pass muster under section 9(2), they cannot be presumed to be unfairly discriminatory,’232 
Nothing can be further from the truth that ‘assessing governmental purposes on their own terms 
has the result that the testing of their legitimacy by definition does not involve an evaluation 
that takes into account the full spectrum of competing interests and a determination of their 
relative weight in terms of an integrative account of the Constitution’s value structure.’233  It is 
again correct that ‘the constitutional validity of the way in which a particular governmental 
purpose is realized’234 should however, ‘be decided with reference to how its realisation gives 
effect to the Constitution’s values and how it impacts on other constitutionally recognised 
goods and interests, if the risk of distorting the constitutional value structure by elevating a 
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particular governmental objective as an end in itself is to be avoided.’235  The rationality 
standard of review premised on section 9 (2)’s internal test for compliance of affirmative action 
measures emerges to follow a different approach.  Rautenbach notes that this exposition 
disregards the inherent content of the significant part of this sub-section, in particular its first 
sentence, which states that equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms, which failure undermines the ‘inter-textual’ approach.236 
According to the inter-textual approach, ‘a proper reading of the first sentence of section 9(2) 
would seem to demand the consideration, in reviewing any affirmative measure which purports 
to comply with section 9(2), of the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. That 
is, it demands consideration of the impact of any such measure on those disadvantaged by it.’237 
4.5. Fair discrimination 
 
The first of the leading cases to determine the concept of fair discrimination in the 
constitutional ethos was Hugo.  In this case the alleged discrimination was on listed grounds, 
that is, discrimination on the ground of sex and on the analogous grounds of the parenthood 
of children under the age of 12.238  The complainant was a sentenced father and had a small 
child of 12 years old.239  The former President of South Africa, Doctor Nelson Mandela, 
had granted remission of sentence to all mothers with small children.240  The granting of 
remission was to serve the interest of their children.241  To support this objective it was 
submitted in court that, generally speaking mothers are primarily responsible for the care of 
small children in our society.242 
This general submission was affirmed in court, but the court held that it did not answer the 
question whether discrimination was fair. However, the court held that it will be inevitably 
unfair for discrimination to have regard to that particular generalisation when refusing 
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in housekeeping and child rearing historically had been prejudicial and was detrimental to 
women in that it has barred women from making progress. 244  The court stated the following: 
To use the generalization that women bear a greater proportion of the burdens of child rearing 
for justifying treatment that deprives women of benefits or advantages or imposes disadvantages 
upon them would clearly, therefore, be unfair. 
However, Goldstone J stated that what the President had done in this case was unique, in that 
the President had granted benefits to mothers with small children which were not afforded to 
fathers.  The discrimination was against the group of individuals, namely, fathers, who had 
not historically been subjected to disadvantage.245  The discrimination was thus not an unfair 
one.246  The President’s act was unequivocally equated to a worthy and vital societal 
goal.247  The Constitutional Court in adjudicating this matter had regard to the 
determination of an unfair impact of the discrimination.  It held that when determining an 
unfair impact the inquiry should not be confined only to a person or group who has been 
disadvantaged but also extends to ‘the nature of power in which the discrimination was 
effected, and also the nature of interests which have been affected by discrimination.’248  Most 
importantly it is a consideration of the purpose which was sought to be achieved by that 
nature of power.249 
In this case, the Interim Constitution had granted the President power to determine when, in 
his view, the public welfare could be better served by the granting of a remission of sentence 
or other form of pardon.250  The determination exercise in regard to the unfair impact of 
discrimination is credibly set out in Harksen.  The court stated that, to determine whether 
the contravening act has impacted on the aggrieved party unfairly, the following factors 
must be taken into account: 
‘(1) The position of the complainants in society and whether they have been victims of past 
patterns of discrimination. Differential treatment that burdens people in a disadvantaged 
position is more likely to be unfair than burdens placed on those who are relatively well 
off. 
(2) The nature of the discriminating law or action and the purpose sought to be achieved by 
it. An important consideration would be whether the primary purpose of the law or action 
is to achieve a worthy and important societal goal. 
(3) The extent to which the rights of the complainant have been impaired and whether there 
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These factors are well set out, in that their objective and cumulative assessment give ‘precision 
and elaboration’ to the constitutional test of unfairness.  These factors are not a closed list and 
hence are accommodative of other factors that would emerge as the quality of jurisprudence 
continues to develop.252  While the President’s act constituted a disadvantage to fathers with 
small children under the age of 12, this act did not circumscribe their rights or obligations as 
fathers.253  The court stated that it could not have held that the discriminatory act by the President 
denied or circumscribed their freedom in that their freedom had been curtailed as the result of 
their conviction, and not by the act of the President.254 
The court held further that the President’s act denied rights to fathers with small children to 
which they had no legal entitlement.255  The President had led evidence by way of an affidavit 
stating that fathers with small children had been welcomed to apply in the ordinary way for 
remission of their sentences on the basis of their individual circumstances.256  While the act 
denied the fathers the opportunity it offered to mothers, the court stated that it did not 
fundamentally impair their right to dignity or sense of equal worth.257 
The refusal to grant remission of sentence to male prisoners on the same terms and conditions 
as mothers was justified because the release of fathers would have had a negative impact and 
could not amount to the better serving of public welfare as was required by the President.258 
The release of fathers would have meant that a large number of male prisoners would have 
gained their release.259  It was undeniable that the role played by fathers in children’s rearing is 
a secondary role in comparison to that of mothers.260  At the time of the remission of sentence, 
crime was considered to have reached a shocking level, and releasing male prisoners would 
have certainly prompted a public outcry.261  When objectively balancing all the crucial 
factors in determining whether the discrimination had an unfair impact, it cannot be stated 
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The next chapter will critically analyse the fairness and proportionality standard in contrast to 
rationality standard to search after a ‘normative unity of the Constitution to optimise the 
realisation-potential of all competing constitutionally recognised goods: all must be set limits 
in order that all may acquire optimal efficacy.’263  The search after a standard that will bring 
related constitutional provisions into the equation and facilitates the consideration of the effect 
of its interpretation on the normative unity of the Constitution as a whole. 264 
4.7. Summation of findings 
 
This chapter has evaluated the concept of unfair discrimination for purposes of affirmative 
action.  It is not differentiation that is prohibited but instead unfair discrimination.  The 
governmental act must correlate with a defensible vision of the public good and serve to 
enhance the cohesiveness and the integrity of the legislation under the rule of law and the state 
ought to act in a rational manner in this regard.  Decisions must be rationally related to the 
purpose for which the power was given, otherwise they are in effect arbitrary and inconsistent 
with this requirement.  This latter principle goes beyond differentiation, once the decision 
if found to be rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given it is 
unnecessary to ask whether there was violation of the equality right.  This principle underlies 
the concept of review for decisions taken under the concepts of affirmative action 
measures.  This is the rationality standard and is the minimum standard and it is not 
necessary to complete the enquiry. 
The biggest failure of the rationality standard is to facilitate the assessment of governmental 
purposes on their own terms which results in the testing of their legitimacy by definition and 
does not involve an evaluation that takes into account the full spectrum of competing interests 
and a determination of their relative weight in terms of an integrative account of the 
Constitution’s value structure.  This denies a clear test of discrimination in the listed ground 
in section 9 (3), and denies the presumption of unfair discrimination in section 9(5).  To 
recapitulate the rationality standard is essentially self-legitimizing in that it rests on the critique 
that treats government purposes as given and ends in themselves. 
It self-explanatory that the Constitutional Court has contextualised its interpretation of the 
affirmative action clause of the Constitution in a manner which principally isolated it from the 
broader normative framework of the equality guarantee and the Constitution as a whole. 
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Accordingly, in the context of equality challenges to affirmative action, the Court opted to 
extract the constitutional conditions for validity from s 9(2) exclusively, to the exclusion of the 










THE BARNARD DECISION 
 
This chapter undertakes a critical analysis of the leading Constitutional Court judgment on the 
concept of affirmative action measures and their standard of review, being South African Police 
Service v Solidarity abo Barnard 265 
5.2. Judicial standard for the implementation of legitimate affirmative action measures 
 
The critical evaluation of the judicial standard comes about as a result of a series of disjunctive 
and opposing judgments from the Labour Court, as well as from the Labour Appeal Court and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal.  These judgments were anticipated to bring insight and direction 
on the determination of the appropriate and applicable judicial standard for the implementation 
of affirmative action measures.  However, these judgements did not provide the relief 
sought by the litigants, due to uncertainty on the ongoing question of the appropriate and 
applicable judicial standard for the implementation of affirmative action measures.  As a result 
the litigants resorted to bringing their case to the Constitutional Court. 
Ms Barnard applied for a position which had been advertised on two different occasions and 
she was the first choice of the interviewing panel both times.  She was not promoted because 
her appointment would not address representivity at her salary level, but neither would it affect 
the racial representivity of the division as she was already a part of the division.266  Her claim 
was that of unfair discrimination based on the ground of race in terms of section 6(1) the 
EEA.267  The employer, the South African Police Service (SAPS), replied that the National 
Commissioner, who had the discretion to appoint or not, acted lawfully in pursuit of a 
legitimate employment equity plan and thus it was a legitimate and justifiable differentiation 
because it was based on legitimate grounds and a defensible Employment Policy and Plan.268 
However, the fundamental question in this case pertains to the appropriate and applicable 
judicial standard in determining Barnard’s complaints, which fall within the parameters of 
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The Constitutional Court’s determination on this uncertain legal issue was eagerly awaited, not 
only by the parties or litigants, but by the whole community of South Africa.  This is 
because the concept of affirmative action is embraced as an equality-driven concept by the 
Constitution of South Africa269 and raises important questions regarding the appropriate 
and applicable judicial standard for the implementation of such measures. 
The Constitutional Court in Barnard confirmed the established legal principle laid down in 
Van Heerden about the appropriate and applicable judicial standard for the implementation of 
measures.  However, it should be noted from the Constitutional Court in Barnard that, as 
much as the judges arrived at the same conclusion, there were different opinions 
expressed in reaching their conclusions.  Moseneke DCJ in the majority judgment wrote 
that the judicial standard for review is the rationality standard and, while it is the bare 
minimum requirement, it suffices and there is no need to define the standard finally. The 
correctness of this statement will be assessed. 
5.3. The commentary on the Van Heerden judgements 
 
It is necessary to look into the ratio of this case, having noted that its legal principle was 
confirmed in the Barnard case.  Briefly, this judgment has been criticised for failing 
to incorporate fairness into its standard.270  Rautenbach expresses the view that the approach 
taken pays deference towards the state actors involved in drafting and implementing 
affirmative action measures and that this approach is out of line with the general standard of 
review set out by the drafters of the Constitution, in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.271 
In a well-worded statement, Malan points out that the ‘rationality standard may also implicate 
a separation of power when one considers the role of the courts in respect of constitutional 
adjudication (and their discrete oversight over the conduct of the executive)’272  On the other 
hand, Pretorious, Klinck and Ngwena have underscored the fact that Moseneke DCJ in this 
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Pretorius et al’s commentary reveals the issues that concern the applicable and appropriate 
judicial standard for the implementation of affirmative action measures. The opinions raised in 
Pretorius et al are enough to invite opposing judgments in the abovementioned courts. 
5.4. The nature and the extent of protection provided in section 9(2) of the Constitution 
 
The submission of Moseneke DCJ that ‘our state must direct reasonable public resources to 
achieve substantive equality for full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms’274 is well 
intended.  Contrary to Moseneke DCJ’s view that affirmative active measures cannot 
be presumed to be unfair in their impact on members of the non-designated groups,275 
such position can be counterproductive. McGregor notes that ‘any denial that legitimate 
restitutionary measures can be unfair in its application would be facetious’.276  Legitimate 
restitutionary measures can be unfair in their application, yet Moseneke DCJ holds that such 
application must be lawful.277 
5.4.1. The rationality standard 
 
Moseneke DCJ stated that affirmative action measures and their implementation are not 
immune from judicial scrutiny.278  Thus, he is correct in saying that measures that are 
directed at remedying the past discrimination must be formulated with due regard not to 
impact unfairly the dignity of all concerned.279  It is right to be vigilant that remedial 
measures under the Constitution do not become an end in themselves, as they are not 
meant to be punitive and retaliatory. 280 
Erasmus J in the case of Du Preez v Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development & 
others281 affirmed that Parliament in compliance with the dictates of section 9 (4) of the 
Constitution enacted the national legislation in the form of two measures: firstly, the EEA 282 
and, secondly, the Equality Act.283  These acts flowed from and continue to give effect to section 
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In as far as the EEA is concerned, section 6(2) states that it is not unfair to take affirmative 
action measures consistent with the purpose of EEA, which is as follows: 
‘The purpose of this Act is to achieve equity in the workplace by - 
(a) promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the 
elimination of unfair discrimination; and 
(b) implementing affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in 
employment experienced by designated groups, in order to ensure their equitable 
representation in all occupational levels in the workforce.’285 
It is worth noting that, in the interpretation of section 6 (2) of the EEA, although affirmative 
action measures do not necessarily disadvantage any other persons, inevitably some measures 
will have that effect.286  This is possible when one person is preferred over another on the 
basis of race or gender in the appointment to a position for which both had applied.287 
The minority judgment reasoned that since Barnard’s claim of unfair discrimination was 
sourced from the contravention of the EEA, such imposes an additional standard to 
rationality.288  Further, constitutional values can be in tension when implementing affirmative 
action measures, thus courts are required to examine implementation with a more exacting level 
of scrutiny.289  An additional standard to a rationality standard is necessary.  The 
minority judgment makes a special call for fairness and this call is a step in the right 
direction. 
In Barnard an inquiry into section 13 of the EEA was made pertaining to its compliance 
whether there was a plan or not, the legitimacy of that plan.  In section 15 a similar enquiry 
was done towards preferential treatment, numeral goals and exclusion of quotas.  These 
provisions were looked at in conjunction with section 2 and 6(2) of the EEA.  It emerged from 
this inquiry that Ms Barnard did not challenge the plan or the racial and gender targets it 
embodied.290  Thus, in the absence of a proper challenge and argument, the Court could not 
undermine the decision- maker’s stated reasons on this point.291  Ms Barnard made no 
challenge to the fairness, validity and legitimacy of the formulation and implementation of 
measures, and they were in accordance with section 13 obligations and section 15 read with 
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The minority finding concluded that the facts in Barnard showed that the National 
Commissioner’s decision passes the fairness standard.292  The minority judgement stated that 
what was determinative to them was the pronounced over-representation of white women at 
the salary level to which Ms Barnard was applying.293 
Moseneke DCJ in Barnard heeded the appeal by Ngcobo J that the transformation must be 
carried out in accordance with the context of the Constitution.294  Thus, it is trite that for 
measures to escape constitutional invalidity they must comply with the protection test standard 
provided in section 9(2).295  Once the measure passes the foregoing test, Moseneke DCJ 
notes, it is neither unfair nor presumed to be unfair.296  He makes the assertion that this 
statement is given expression by the Constitution.  This interpretation which Moseneke 
DCJ read into section 9 (2) finds expression in section 6(2) of EEA, and not section 9 (2) of 
the Constitution.  His assertion puts measures beyond the purview of the EEA, irrespective 
of their content and effect on others.297 Erasmus J raises a valid question about the nature and 
extent of protection.  He stated that ‘if the provisions of subsection (2) of s 9 were to be 
interpreted as constituting an exception to the unfair discrimination proscribed by 
subsection (3), then persons disadvantaged by affirmative action measures would have no 
protection under the equality rights guaranteed by the Constitution.’298 
In considering whether affirmative action measures are an exception or not, Van der 
Westhuizen J writes that, in keeping with a holistic reading of section 9, the measures provided 
for in section 9(2) are not exceptions to the right to equality; they form part of it.299  He notes 
that the appropriate assumption under our constitutional framework is that restitutionary or 
affirmative measures should be welcomed rather than viewed with suspicion.300 
5.5. The interpretation of section 9(2) of the Constitution in the Barnard case (CC) 
 
It is necessary to look at the ambit and tenets of the interpretation of statutes and, because the 
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interpretation of the legislation.301  According to section 39, the courts must promote the 
spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights when interpreting any legislation. Ngcobo J 
states that implicit in this prescript are two prepositions: ‘first, the interpretation that is 
placed upon a statute must, where possible, be one that would advance at least an identifiable 
value enshrined in the Bill of Rights; and, second, the statute must be reasonably capable 
of such interpretation.’302 
Ngcobo J states that this interpretation is attributed to the fact that the Bill of Rights is the 
cornerstone of our constitutional democracy.  It affirms the democratic values of human dignity, 
equality and freedom.303  Thus, when interpreting any provision, promotion must be given to 
the values of this constitutional democracy.304 
The interpretation that measures cannot be presumed to be unfair is quite far out of the target 
of subsection 2 of section 9 of the Constitution.305  This interpretation is foreign in an intra- 
textual approach in reading the equality rights.306  This interpretation would not pass either 
of the implied twofold test by Ngcobo J; firstly the interpretation which does not advance at 
least identifiable value enshrined in the Bill of Rights, will be bound to fail; secondly, this 
interpretation is not reasonably capable of being sourced from the reading of the equality right. 
There is a valid point for concern here.  By implying that measures cannot be presumed unfair, 
this interpretation does not regard the impact of the measures on the members of non- 
designated groups.  Even if it were to be accepted that this interpretation will advance at least 
an identifiable value enshrined in the Bill of Rights, the interpretation that measures cannot be 
presumed to be unfair cannot be acceptable in this case, because this interpretation is not 
reasonably capable of being sourced from the reading of the equality right of the Constitution. 
The EEA arguably gives effect to subsection 3 of section 9 of the Constitution. However, it is 
trite that, when applying the Bill of Rights, courts must promote all the values that are 
fundamentally enshrined in the Bill of Rights. As a result, courts should not readily accept the 
exclusion or diminution of a fundamental right even by another constitutional right, and 
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constructions that govern the interpretation of the ordinary law.  Thus, it is persuasive to 
call for an approach that is ‘acutely sensitive to all constitutional values and objectives.’308  
In that context, ‘an interpretation of s 9(2) of the Constitution that sees its implicit 
approval of affirmative action measures as excluding or negating the right to equality, will 
therefore offend constitutional principle.’309 
5.6. The question of the appropriateness of the rationality standard 
 
When Moseneke DCJ evaluated the question about the manner in which properly adopted 
affirmative action measures were to be implemented and whether they can be challenged,310 his 
finding was in the affirmative.  He concluded that there is no valid reason ‘why courts 
are precluded from deciding whether a valid employment equity plan has been put into 
practice lawfully’.311  He eloquently stated that a validly adopted employment equity plan 
must be put to use lawfully.312  This statement disagrees with his controversial statement 
that measures cannot be presumed unfair.  Rautenbach put it differently, stating that ‘the 
only logical implication is that the determination of the lawfulness of the implementation 
of affirmative action measures otherwise rational measure must be its fairness and or the 
impact of such implementation on the right of those disadvantaged by it’ 313  He says 
Moseneke DCJ in the Barnard case himself exposed the inappropriateness of the rationality 
standard of review when he chose a bare minimum standard, and said that, as far as the 
principle of legality is concerned, the ‘implementation of measures would require to be 
rationally related to the terms and objects of the measure.’314  Measures must advance their 
legitimate purpose and nothing else in their application.  He says ordinarily, irrational 
conduct in implementing a lawful project attracts unlawfulness.  Moreover, Moseneke 
DCJ reiterated that the implementation of corrective measures must be rational, and as 
much as this rationality standard is the bare minimum requirements, it is not necessary to 
define the standard finally.315 
It seems that this emphatic statement on the lawfulness implementation would suggest that a 
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rationality standard ‘in terms of Van Heerden’s interpretation of the internal test for compliance 
as found in section 9 (2) is truly sufficient to mark such measure as constitutionally compliant, 
then this consideration regarding the implementation of measures must be surely irrelevant.’317 
The appropriateness of the rational standard is indeed questionable, and without doubt this 
judicial standard is not sufficient, despite the fact that the judges in Barnard showed deference 
in the Moseneke DCJ’s main judgment.  Three judges implied that they were willing to 
reject this judicial standard.318 Cameron J, Froneman J and Majiedt AJ were bold in their 
approach to determining Ms. Barnard’s case; they said in adjudicating this matter that it 
required them to apply a less deferential standard than mere rationality.319  This approach 
surely underscores the inappropriateness of the rationality standard.  In Van Heerden 
Moseneke DCJ stated that ‘a measure should not constitute an abuse of power or impose 
such substantial and undue harm on those excluded from its benefits that our long-term 
constitutional goal would be threatened.’320 
Rautenbach appears to be right when she says a ‘reference to the substantial harm to those 
excluded from benefits simply cannot refer merely to the lawfulness of implementation of a 
measure being measured with reference to rationality; it must require interrogation of the 
fairness of such implementation.’321 
5.7. Constitutional adjudication 
 
Pretorius writes that the ‘Constitution commits itself to a standard of review which requires all 
rights limiting action to be reasonable and justifiable in an open democratic society based on 
human equality, dignity and freedom.’322  Pretorius makes a valid point that the Constitution 
prescribes this standard for assessing whether limits imposed on the realisation of a rights in a 
particular context is justified.323 
In a separate minority judgment, Van der Westhuizen J noted that a ‘measure might be 
legitimate in form, but its application may be unlawful.324  Moseneke DCJ in the majority 
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put to use lawfully.’325  Van der Westhuizen J says that ‘courts are generally reluctant to 
presume that provisions in the Constitution operate in tension and so try to construe them 
harmoniously’326 
Van der Westhuizen J states that constitutional provisions – including those protecting rights – 
have to be interpreted within the context of the Constitution as a whole.327  It is 
an undeniable fact that no provision may be interpreted in isolation and no right protected 
and enforced without regard to other rights.328  In particular, the exercise of one constitutional 
right may often have to be balanced against another.  It seems that this is what out our 
courts lack in their adjudication of the right to equality.  In particular the jurisprudence of 
the Van Heerden and Barnard judgment are both exemplary as they could not construe 
harmoniously constitutional provisions that operate in tensions.  This is evident from their 
determination of the appropriate standard applicable in the implementation of affirmative 
action measures.  Woolman and Botha acknowledge this concern, and suggest that, when a 
court is presented with hard choices, it ‘must not view the choice of one good over another 
good in hard cases as arbitrary.  Instead, it must be candid about the reasons for its choices 
and hope that its candour about the reasons for its choices ultimately reflects the exercise of 
good judgment.’329 
Van der Westhuizen J makes a call directed to section 7 (3) and 36 of the Constitution,330 which 
states that rights are subject to limitations contained in the Bill of Rights or in other provisions 
of the Constitution and this call is well-intended. He says that as much as this formula is 
applicable to the law of general application but it could be very effective in measuring the 
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The best thing about this formula is that a limitation analysis is an acknowledgment that 
constitutional democracies are faced with complex competing interests, rights and values. 
5.8. Summation of findings 
 
It is evident that the rationality standard of review is not capable of balancing the competing 
interests, rights and values enshrined in the Constitution.  Moseneke DCJ in Barnard exposed 
the inappropriateness of the rationality standard of review.  Moseneke DCJ made an 
emphatic statement on the lawful implementation of measures and this inevitably 
suggests that a perfectly rational measure can be abused.  Noting that measures might be 
legitimate in form and unlawful in their application, it is not appropriate to say that measures 
cannot be presumed to be unfair.  Thus, it is not unreasonable to call for a fairness test as 
a judicial standard of review. However, it should be noted that Moseneke DCJ in 
Van  Heerden and Barnard, along with Van der Westhuizen J, cries foul that measures are 
understood as equality-driven mechanisms in their own right, rather than carve-outs from 
what is discriminatory. 
The appropriate assumption under our constitutional framework is that restitutionary or 
affirmative measures should be welcomed rather than viewed with suspicion.  It is 
submitted that the section 36 limitation clause is the best judicial standard of review, in a 
limitation analysis is acknowledgment that constitutional democracies are faced — and must 
wrestle — with complex competing interests, rights and values.  With regard to the 
ongoing legal issue about the appropriate judicial standard for the implementation of 
legitimate affirmative action measures, the formula in terms of section 36 provides good 





CHAPTER 6: SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
6.1. Outline 
This chapter is preceded by the critical evaluation of the rationality standard against the 
background of unfair discrimination, as illustrated by the Constitutional Court cases that have 
formed the frame of reference in the jurisprudence of normative standard of rationality.  
An evaluative and critical analyses of an appropriate standard of review begun when 
rationality as a standard of review for affirmative action measures was assessed in the context 
of its efficacy and productivity in the new constitutional order.  This chapter will in addition 
contrast the tests of fairness and proportionality against the rationality standard. 
6.2. The coherence of constitutional democracy 
 
South Africa is founded on a constitutional democracy.  The need for a normative 
standard emanates from a democratic necessity to have a properly conceived standard of 
constitutional review of legislation and other governmental action.332  Thus, the coherence of 
constitutional democracy through constitutional review will be articulated by showing the 
interrelatedness of the substantive normative standard of constitutional review with core 
democratic values.333  The importance of such standard serves to institutionalise democratic 
values in and through adjudicative process by determining both intensity and normative 
substance of the duty of public justification which is the essential element of a deliberative 
democracy.334 
An intrinsic standard will be determined by assessing the key components of a deliberative 
democracy which will be a normative benchmark for evaluating the democratic credentials of 
the substantive standard of constitutional review.335  Thus it is important to ask first ‘how the 
substantive standards of constitutional review can enhance or diminish public accountability 
through deliberative participation in the context of the process of constitutional review.’336 
Secondly, the question goes to ‘the scope that substantive standards of constitutional review 
allow for facilitating the kind of normative discourse that a deliberative understanding of 
democracy ideally envisages.’337  Thirdly, it could be said that the rationality test is endowed 
with tools to keep the coherence of constitutional democracy.  Accordingly, the analysis will be 
conducted with reference to the way the Constitutional Court has conceptualised and applied 
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the standard of rationality in the course of constitutional review of legislation and other 
governmental action in particular contexts.’338  This dissertation argues for the amendment of 
the normative rationality standard for affirmative action measures.339 
A reference to deliberative democracy requires that, for its legitimacy under permanent moral 
diversity, the deliberative conception of democracy would have to be organised around an ideal 
of political justification - in that such requires the finding of publicly acceptable reasons for 
collectively binding reasons.340  Democratic legitimacy is based on such that it is intimately 
‘linked to the ability and opportunity to participate in an effective deliberation on the part of 
those subject to collective decisions, which ‘requires justification in terms that, on reflection, 
[people] are capable of accepting.’341  A ‘deliberative understandings of democracy therefore 
represent an attempt to acknowledge and accommodate moral diversity from a standpoint of 
discursive inclusion based on equal concern and respect.’342  The crucial point of a 
deliberative democracy process requires an account of how decisions equates when 
evaluated in terms of dialectical understanding of the constitutive values of democratic 
legitimacy.343  Public justification is an indispensable figure of democratic legitimacy 
through deliberative engagement and this will capacitate the exponents of deliberative 
democracy to credible reconcile democracy and constitutionalism. 
6.3. Constitutionalism 
 
Constitutionalism is an ideal that government ought to derive its powers from a written 
constitution and that its powers ought to be limited to those set out in the constitution.344  Thus, 
it is commendable that for an effective limitation on state power, three associated principles of 
law, that is to say constitutional supremacy, justiciability and entrenchment provide a 
normative benchmark.345  Constitutionalism, incidentally, has been principally postulated as a 
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disconnected from the notion of democracy itself.346  As a result, a critique of courts and judges 
is that, notwithstanding that the latter are unelected, they have power to strike down the 
decisions of a democratic legislature and a democratic representative government. 
Constitutionalism provides that democracy is not simply ‘the rule of the people but always the 
rule of people within certain predetermined channels, according to certain procedures.’347  In 
this context, ‘the pre-commitment to certain procedural and substantive constrains on the power 
of the majority that are inherent in the constitutionalism make democracy stronger not 
weaker.’348  In addition, a perspective of deliberative understanding of democracy, ‘lays a more 
plausible foundation for the constitutive function of constitutionally protected values and rights 
as necessary conditions for the legitimacy of democratic will- formation.’349  In this context 
‘democratic legitimation through public justification depends on the extent to which a 
constitution is designed to, and succeeds in, safeguarding the deliberative legitimacy conditions 
of democratically established law.’350 
Pretorius asserts that justification through deliberative engagement is dependent ‘on both 
procedural (participatory) and substantive (public reason) conditions’351  Accordingly, he states 
that ‘constitutionalism authoritatively defines and safeguards a democracy’s legitimating basis 
by entrenching a deliberative structure, which is defined by both inclusive participation and 
accountability in terms of a particular normative framework.’352 
6.4. Constitutional review 
 
Constitutional review is closely linked to scrutinizing quality and propriety of reasons 
justifying government actions, amongst other aspects. 353  Contrary to the vantage point 
which present constitutionalism to be disconnected from the notion of democracy itself, 







346 JL Pretorius (note 17 above) 417 par 3; see for example: De Waal (note 10 above) 9 par 2, S v Makwanyane    
       1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (Makwanyane); see also Ramatlhodi “The big read: ANC’s fatal concessions” The     
     Times (2011-09-01) available at  
     http://www.timeslive.co.za/opinion/commentary/2011/09/01/the-big- read- anc-s-fatal-  concessions  
    (accessed 2013-11-12). 
347 De Waal (note 10 above) 9-10 par 4; S Holmes “Precommitment and Paradox of Democracy” in J Elster &  
        R Slagstad (eds) Constitutionalism and Democracy (1998) 231. 
348 De Waal (note 10 above) 10 par 1. 
349 JL Pretorius (note 17 above) 417 par 3. 
350 Ibid. 
351 Ibid 418 par 1; De Waal (note 10 above) 10 par 1. 
352 Ibid. 





participation, and it has ‘but also – however provisionally and imperfectly – the normative 
orientation of a democracy’s justificatory discourse.’354 
The role of the latter element, says Pretorius, is to ensure that justificatory reasoning is firmly 
situated in the evaluative space of a Constitution in a properly functioning deliberative 
democracy.355  In this context, Zurn says the tasks of Constitutional review are manifold: 
“keeping open the channels of political change, guaranteeing that individuals’ civil, membership, 
legal, political, and social rights are respected, scrutinizing the constitutional quality and propriety 
of the reasons justifying governmental action, and ensuring that the channels of influence from 
independent civil society public spheres to the strong public sphere remain unobstructed and 
undistorted by administrative, economic, and social powers.”356 
It is manifestly evident from the foregoing quotation that the constitutional review is 
unmatched, and regarding the indeterminacy of much of the constitutional essentials, this 
institution ‘must in order to reflect the interdependence of democracy and constitutionalism 
display a deliberative character.’357  Further, the ‘interpretation and application of the 
Constitution must be equally situated in a fully inclusive deliberative space.’358  From this 
perspective the ‘process of constitutional review itself must be reflective of, and conducive to, 
the substantive democratic values of participation, inclusivity, openness, transparency, and 
public justification.’359 
Thus, the notion of institutionalising public justification in government settings is correlated to 
the need for public accountability.360  Pretorius states that public accountability needs to be 
realised on at least two path.  The first which will not be considered here concerns the complex 
issue of constitutional design of constitutional review which, concerns main issues like 
procedures, powers, and composition of the designated body for exercising this function its 
place in the architecture of democratically constituted governmental institutions. The second 
path has regard to ‘how the substantive standards of constitutional review serve to 
institutionalise the core ethos of deliberative democracy, that is, public justification through 
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potential of these standards to realise core deliberative democratic values, namely transparency, 
inclusivity and accountability in terms of the Constitution’s ‘public reason.’362 
6.4.1. The ‘minimum threshold’ rationality standard 
 
The rationality standard was analysed in chapter 3.363  It is hardly contestable that this standard 
is a minimum requirement prescribing the lowest possible threshold for the validity of the 
exercise of public power. 
It should be clear that the potential of the rationality standard to effect public justification is 
arguably sufficient.  Accordingly, this standard’s capacity to realise the deliberative democratic 
objective of public accountability will be analysed.364 
6.4.2. Rationality, and deliberative democracy and constitutionalism 
 
The rationality standard has the following two issues: firstly it is about its conceptualisation by 
the Constitutional Court, and in this context the methodology of the rationality analysis. 
Secondly, the issue is about ‘the overextension of the scope of application of the rationality 
standard to Bill of Rights disputes in contexts where it is unsuited to bring about the 
constitutionally required degree and kind of justification of limitations of fundamental 
rights.’365 
6.4.3. Instrumental rationality 
 
It evident in Van Heerden that rationality analysis is limited, for the purpose of establishing 
constitutional compliance, to an investigation of the utility of the means to serve particular 
ends. Be that as it may, the rationality standard requires courts to inquire into the legitimacy of 
governmental purpose.  However, such process is superficial in that it is assessed within a non- 
relational, free standing frame of reference. Given that in terms of the rule of law public power 
should not be arbitrary, such denies the need to show the legitimacy of the assailed 
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The rationality standard brings about the assessment of government purposes on their own 
terms, which result is exclusive of ‘the full spectrum of competing interests and a determination 
of their relative weight in terms of an integrative account of the Constitution structure.’367  
The role of rationality in the Constitution value structure as a whole is superficially confined 
to the legitimacy of governmental purpose.  Therefore, a normative benchmark for ‘the 
constitutional validity of the way in which a particular governmental purpose is 
realised’368 should be determined with reference to the way its realisation gives effects to the 
constitutional values.369  As a result, regard ought to be given on ‘impacts on other 
constitutionally recognised goods and interests.’370  From this perspective, this will ensure 
that there is no ‘risk of distorting the constitutional value structure by elevating a 
particular government purpose as an end in itself.’371 
It is clear that ‘the instrumental rationality is ill-suited to serve as a normative constitutional 
standard to justify and legitimise the exercise of public power in order to resolve conflict and 
effect socio-political integration’372  Legal standards are supposed to provide the bases to choose 
amongst various competing ends or relate them in a meaningful way to an integrating 
normative standard in order to claim any democratic justificatory and legitimising value, and 
it is self-explanatory that instrumentality standard has no such bases.373  Given that rationality 
standard is a constitutional norm with the thrust of resolving conflict and realising socio- 
political integration, among other things therefore, this standard offers minimal ‘form of 
framework for reasoning that can prevent the danger of social exclusion and normative 
distortion.’374 
6.4.4. Proportionality  and  overextension  of  the  rationality  standard  in  Bill  of  Rights 
disputes 
It is trite that the rationality standard cannot facilitate the degree of justification required of 
government action which severely impacts of on fundamental rights.375  Section 36 of the 
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to be ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom.’376  The courts’ perspective of section 36 emphasizes that such provides 
a reasonableness standard involving a proportionality requirement.377  As far as section 36 is 
concerned, it requires that the rights-limiting measures be justified by an essential public 
interest and to be less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.378 
The proportionality standard provides the degree of democratic accountability expected of 
rights-limiting measures which the rationality inquiry is not able to do.  Given that the 
rationality standard seeks only minimal ‘measure of justification in respects of legitimacy of 
the purposes pursued and means of coherence, it relieves the state of the duty to justify actions 
into two significant respects.’379  Firstly, it is patent that the rationality standard affords the state 
much latitude regarding the extent to which rights may be limited to achieve governmental 
ends then proportionality standard does.380  The rationality standard, when compared with the 
proportionality standard, does not herald the same responsiveness to situations where the 
infringements of rights are more intrusive.381  In essence, rights limiting measure under 
rationality review will prevail even if disproportional or unfair in that the rationality standard 
of justification does not provide for explanation for the disproportional or invasion of rights.382 
Secondly, it cannot be denied that the rationality standard exempts the state of the intrinsic 
‘justificatory exercise of demonstrating, by means of reason assessment of the competing 
considerations at stake, that a right is outweighed by public good in the particular circumstances 
of the case.’383  However, on the other hand, the proportionality standard makes it a prerequisite 
for the state to account for the prioritisation of public good over a fundamental right in each 
and every circumstances in a legitimate order, that is to say an ‘assessment of the nature of the 
right that is limited, and its importance to an open and democratic society based on freedom 
and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose to 
such a society’.384  The factors postulated in terms of section 36 of the Constitution correspond 




376 JL Pretorius (note 21 above) 427 par 1; C Rautenbach (note 30 above) 4 par 1. 
377 Barnard 2014 (note 14 above) 88 par 90. 
378 Makwanyane (note 346 above) para 104. 
379 JL Pretorius (note 17 above) 421 par 2; see for example Pretorius (note 62 above) 37–42. 
380 Ibid 428 par 1. 
381 Makwanyane (note 346 above) para 104. 
382 JL Pretorius (note 17 above) 428 par 2; Prinsloo (note 180 above) para 36. 
383 Ibid 421 par 2. 
384 Makwanyane (note 346 above) par 104. 





In the essence of section 36, proportionality is endowed with an analytical structure to reveal 
the state exposition of constitutional justice which inform its decision making.386  Therefore, 
this standard matches the ‘service of the democratic values of openness, transparency and 
reason responsiveness.’387  Furthermore, the ‘superior democratic credentials of the principle of 
proportionality recommends it as the appropriate standard in terms of which account must be 
given for rights-limiting measures.’388  It is not difficult to find that proportionality standard 
gives to a wide-ranging contextual frame of reference for solving rights disputes then would 
have been the case when compared with the rationality standard.389 
In light of the interrelatedness of democracy and constitutionalism, ‘the democratic system of 
government as expressed in the Constitution should determine the power to review 
administrative action and the extent thereof.’390  Accordingly, ‘the standards of constitutional 
review ought to be dictated in terms of what is required to give effect to the foundational values 
of accountability, responsiveness and openness’.391  A normative proportionality as the 
constitutional standard of review is preferable in that it facilitates a more deliberatively 
inclusive process of constitutional review that allows more voices to be heard and more 
perspectives to be represented.  This is plausibly done in two ways: firstly, given that 
this standard ascribe to the balancing of competing claims, it allows ‘discursive avenues for a 
wider spectrum of relevant concerns to influence judicial deliberation;’392 secondly, it is 
evident in section 36 that rights limitations are required to be justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and that this section ‘in 
principle opens up reference to any and all the values characteristic of such a society in 
opposition to, or in defence, of the limitation.’393  It is evident with regard to the rationality 
standard that its use ‘structure[s] deliberation in such a way that the perspectives cannot be 
raised because they are categorically deemed irrelevant, irrespective of how closely they 
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6.5. Fairness standard 
 
In Barnard, the minority judgment discussed the tension that arises in the formulation and 
implementation of measures crafted to give effects to the transformative demands of the 
Constitution.395  As a result they indicated a preference for the fairness standard as an 
appropriate and well orientated normative designed to amicably balance competing interests.396 
Goldstone J in Harken tabulated the stages of an inquiry which become necessary when there 
is an alleged violation of the equality clause: 
‘(a)      Does the challenged law or conduct differentiate between people or categories of people? 
If so, does the differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate government 
purpose? If it does not, then there is a violation of s 9 (1). Even if it does bear a rational 
connection, it might nevertheless amount to discrimination. 
(b) Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a two-stage 
analysis: 
(i) Firstly, does the differentiation amounts to discrimination. If it is on a specified 
ground, then discrimination will have been established. If it is not on a specified 
ground, then whether or not there is discrimination will depend upon whether, 
objectively, the ground is based on attributes and characteristics which have the 
potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or 
to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner. 
(ii) Secondly, if the differentiation amounts to ‘discrimination’, does it amount to 
‘unfair discrimination’? If it has been found to have been on a specified ground, 
then unfairness will be presumed. If on an unspecified ground, unfairness will 
have to be established by the complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily 
on the impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her 
situation. 
If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is found not to be 
unfair, then there will be no violation of s 9 (3) and (4). 
(c) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to be made as to 
whether the provision can be justified under the limitation clause.’397 
The foregoing quotation has regard to equality clause violation. Moreover, section 9 of the 
Constitution identifies three ways in which ‘law or conduct might differentiate surely between 
people or categories of people, “mere differentiation” forms part of the first stage of inquiry. 
While it does treat some people differently to others, it does not amount to discrimination.398 
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or established, but the impugned act or conduct is found to be fair, there will be no violation of 
quality clause.399 
It was determined in Harksen that in order to determine whether the discriminatory measure 
has an unfair impact on the aggrieved person, it becomes necessary to have regard to the “nature 
of the provision and the purpose sought to be achieved by it”.400  Goldstone J specifically 
used the example of a remedial or restitutionary measure to explain the relevance of 
this  factor: 
‘If its purpose is manifestly not directed, in the first instance, at impairing the complainants in 
the manner indicated above, but is aimed at achieving a worthy and important societal goal, such 
as, for example, the furthering of equality for all, this purpose may, depending on the facts of the 
particular case, have a significant bearing on the question whether complainants have in fact 
suffered the impairment in question’.401 
It is generally accepted that the underlying reason for the incorporation of affirmative action in 
the Constitution was to institutionalise its protection from stringent standards of review.  
Such scrutiny facilitated the demise of such measures in United State of America.402  
It should be born in mind that Moseneke J in Van Heerden explicitly cast the 
fairness standard as not befitting section 9 substantive equality approaches.403  He stated 
that the American equality jurisprudence regards ‘affirmative action measures as a suspect 
category which must pass strict scrutiny.’ 404  This approach is the main basis upon which 
fairness standard is rejected as the standard of judicial review for affirmative action 
measures. 
On the contrary, Pretorius argues that the fairness test, which had its inception in Harksen, does 
not necessarily open doors for American-style strict scrutiny.405  He says the fairness test 
generously accommodates affirmative action measures in that, if the purpose of a measure is 
aimed at the ‘furthering of equality for all, this purpose may, depending on the facts of the 
particular case, have a significant bearing on the question whether complainants have in fact 
suffered the impairment in question.’406  From this perspective, Pretorius says that, considering 
the contextual factor of the nature of the differential measures and their importance in the 
fairness inquiry, ‘courts are, in the process of weighing them against conflicting or competing 
interests, bound to take judicial notice of the constitutional endorsement of the necessity of 
such  measures  and  accord  their  remedial  purpose  the  importance  intended  by  the 
 
 
399 J de Waal (note 10 above) 244 par 1. 
400 Harksen (note 181 above) 50. 
401 Ibid. 
402 JL Pretorius (note 1 above) 550; Van Heerden (note 2 above) par 147. 
403 Van Heerden (note 2 above) par 29. 
404 Ibid. 
405 JL Pretorius (note 1 above) 550. 





Constitution.’407 He plausibly says such measures will not reflexively be subject to strict 
judiciary scrutiny merely because they differentiate on the prohibited ground.408  Be that as it 
may, he notes that fairness and proportionality of a differential measure cannot rest on a means 
to an end focus, but ought to ultimately have to be determined with reference to the 
accumulative effect of all relevant factors.409  He does not lose the sight over the impact which 
such measures may have on competing rights and interest on those detrimentally affected by 
it. 
This indicates that the remedial or restitutionary nature and purpose of the measures are not 
placed beyond the reach and need for a fairness scrutiny as such, but must be treated as weighty 
considerations in favour of a finding of fairness. 
6.6. Summation of findings 
 
In the perspective of affirming the constitutional democracy, the contrast on overall standards 
reveals that the rationality standard does not affirm the coherence of constitutional democracy. 
This because this standard falls short of the important figure of constitutional review, which is 
reflective of, and conducive to, the substantive democratic values of participation, inclusivity, 
openness, transparency, and public justification.  The methodology of the rationality 
analysis risks encouraging a narrow instrumental version of rationality, 
The rationality standard brings about the assessment of government purposes on their own 
terms, which results in the testing of their legitimacy, exclusive of ‘the full spectrum of 
competing interests and a determination of their relative weight in terms of an integrative 
account of the Constitution structure.’410  Therefore, a normative benchmark for ‘the 
constitutional validity of the way in which a particular governmental purpose is realised’411 
should be determined with reference to the way its realisation gives effects to the constitutional 
values.412 
Legal standards are supposed to provide the basis to choose amongst varying competing ends 
or to relate them in a meaningful way to an integrating normative standard in order to claim 
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instrumentality standard has no such basis.413  The proportionality standard provides the 
degree of democratic accountability expected of rights-limiting measures, whereas the 
rationality inquiry is not able to realise such.  Standards of constitutional review ought to 
be dictated in terms of what is required to give effect to the foundational values of 
accountability, responsiveness and openness.414  A normative proportionality standard of 
review is more appropriate in that it facilitates a more inclusive process of constitutional 
review that allows more voices to be heard and more perspectives to be represented. 
It is true that the fairness test generously accommodates affirmative action measures in that, if 
the purpose of a measure is aimed at the ‘furthering of equality for all, this purpose may, 
depending on the facts of the particular case, have a significant bearing on the question whether 
complainants have in fact suffered the impairment in question.’415  From this perspective courts 
are, in the process of weighing measures against conflicting or competing interests, bound to 
take judicial notice of the constitutional endorsement of the necessity of such measures and 
accord their remedial purpose the importance intended by the Constitution. 
The fairness and proportionality of a differential measure cannot rest on a means to an end 
focus, but ought to ultimately have a determination with reference to the accumulative effect 
of all relevant factors.416  Accordingly, consideration ought to be given to the impact which 
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This study focuses on the challenges facing the Constitutional Court in adjudicating affirmative 
action disputes, being the reconciliation of the compelling need for transformative justice with 
the core function of the Constitution to integrate, in a fair and proportional manner, the diversity 
of rights and interests at stake.  The challenge is facilitated by the rationality standard which, it 
is argued, fails to enhance the court’s capacity and role to integrate and weigh up competing 
rights and interests entrenched in the Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court in Barnard instead opted to extract the constitutional conditions for 
validity of affirmative action measures from section 9 (2) exclusively.  Thus, there is no regard 
given to the fairness and proportionality requirements of section 9 (3) and 36 respectively, 
which serves to imply that affirmative action is a means to end, and self-justifying.  This critique 
is borne out in the majority judgement in Barnard where Moseneke CDJ reaffirmed that, if 
restitutionary measures, even based on any of the prohibitory grounds of discrimination in 
section 9 (3), pass muster under section 9 (2), they cannot be presumed to be unfairly 
discriminatory.417  However, Moseneke CDJ concedes that, irrational conduct in implementing 
a lawful project attracts unlawfulness.  Moseneke DCJ notes that the rationality standard bears 
the minimum requirements, and it is not necessary to define the standard finally.418  It is a 
cause for concern that these measures could be constituent in the abuse of power or impose 
substantial and undue harm on those excluded from its benefits or that they should be 
unfair in their applications.419  Be that as it may, he states that an affirmative action measure 
‘must be applied to advance its purpose and nothing else.’ 420 
It is of concern that the third inquiry in Van Heerden imports considerations that go beyond 
rationality testing.421 This inquiry must take into account whether the measure undermines the 
goal of section 9 to promote the long-term vision of a society based on non-racialism and non- 
sexism and must be alive to shifting circumstances and the distribution of privilege and under-
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This research acknowledges that affirmative action measures are based on the vision of the 
public good and that the government’s purpose is to protect and advance persons or categories 
of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.  However, it is important to 
safeguard against unfair or unreasonably disproportional forms of affirmative action that 
would be irreconcilable with realising the long term ideal of equality based on the 
affirmation of equal worth and respect. 
In chapter 4 it was noted that ‘constitutionally, the vision of public good cannot be limited to a 
particular public purpose and the coherence or integrity of a particular governmental aims is 
evidently not determinable by means of self-reference only.’423  The use of self-reference 
only, ‘flies in the face of the fact that in reality no social good is pursued in a space 
devoid of competing interests and to treat them as such would be tantamount to judging 
the constitutionality of measures designed to promote such goods in terms of their own 
stated objectives only.’424  The Constitutional Court’s contextualization, in its interpretation 
of the affirmative action clause of the Constitution, has principally isolated this clause 
from the broader normative framework of the equality guarantee and the Constitution as a 
whole.  As a result this approach limits basic constitutional values and undermines the 
ability of the Constitution to meaningfully integrate competing interests, in the context of 
affirmative action disputes, in a comprehensive and fair manner. 
This dissertation has found that the inappropriateness of the rationality standard of review 
reveals that a perfectly rational measure can be abused - hence the implementation of measures 
must be lawful (see chapter 5).  The fairness standard, given that it substantially overlaps with 
the proportionality standard and that its presence in section 9 of the equality clause is 
compelling in the adjudication of claims of discrimination, does not surpass the credentials of 
the proportionality standard. It is because, in keeping with a holistic reading of section 9, the 
measures provided for in section 9(2) are not exceptions to the right to equality; they form part 
of it.425  The appropriate assumption under the constitutional framework is that restitutionary or 
affirmative action measures should be welcomed rather than viewed with suspicion.426 
In chapter 6 this study considered overall standards and found that the rationality standard does 
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the important principle of constitutional review which is reflective of, and conducive to, the 
substantive democratic values of participation, inclusivity, openness, transparency, and public 
justification.  The methodology of the rationality analysis risks encouraging a narrow 
instrumental version of rationality, 
The rationality standard brings about the assessment of government purposes on their own 
terms, which results in the testing of their legitimacy, exclusive of ‘the full spectrum of 
competing interests and a determination of their relative weight in terms of an integrative 
account of the Constitution structure.’427  Therefore, a normative benchmark for ‘the 
constitutional validity of the way in which a particular governmental purpose is realised’428 
should be determined with reference to the way its realisation gives effects to the constitutional 
values.429 
Legal standards are supposed to provide the basis to choose amongst varying competing ends 
or to relate them in a meaningful way to an integrative normative standard in order to claim 
any democratic justificatory and legitimising value.  It is self-explanatory that the 
instrumentality standard has no such basis.430  It is worth noting that the “standards of 
constitutional review ought to be dictated in terms of what is required to give effect to the 
foundational values of accountability, responsiveness and openness’.431 
This research has dealt with important questions concerning reliance upon rationality as the 
judicial standard of review for affirmative action measures. It is evident from the discussion in 
chapter 4 that the rationality standard fails to adequately address the need for transformative 
justice in keeping with the core function of the Constitution to integrate, in a fair and 
proportional manner, the diversity of rights and interests at stake.  This standard falls short and 
is not effective in promoting the realisation of the constitutional goal of a non-racial, non-sexist 
and socially inclusive society, in which each person will be recognised and treated as a human 
being of equal worth and dignity’. That the rationality standard is certainly incapable of 
adequately facilitating claims of unfair discrimination by those affected by such measures 
during the adjudication of affirmative action disputes is demonstrated in the disjunctive and 
opposing judgements in Barnard decision. The contrast of tests of fairness and proportionality 
against the rationality standard has showed that, of all the substantive standards of 
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constitutional review, the rationality standard is not the most appropriate standard in 
determining disputes regarding affirmative action measures. 
The analysis in this dissertation has built on the research literature to date in order to present a 
new point of view with regard to the jurisprudence of affirmative action measures, evaluating 
the disjunctive and opposing judgments with regard to the rationality standard as a standard of 
judicial review for the claims of unfair discrimination in affirmative action disputes.  
The analysis has suggested a more coherent approach to the rights and values enshrined 
in the Constitution, striking the balance between the beneficiaries of the affirmative action 
measures and those disfavored by it.  The analysis has also assessed divergent scholarly 
debates about a standard of judicial review for affirmative action, and has argued against 
the unsatisfactory status quo adopted in the jurisprudence of affirmative action against 
claims of unfair discrimination in South Africa. 
7.2. Recommendations 
 
Accordingly, it is recommended that the standard of rationality be amended to introduce a more 
substantive normative standard which ensures that the implementation of measures which 
passes constitutional muster also take into account how it may affect other constitutional rights 
and values.432 
A normative proportionality standard of review is more appropriate as it facilitates a more 
inclusive process of constitutional review that allows more voices to be heard and more 
perspectives to be represented.  It considers the impact which such measures may have 
on competing rights and interest on those detrimentally affected by it. 
Thus, whether the implementation of affirmative action measures passes constitutional muster 
or not, one needs to take into account the promotion of equality and how the implementation 
may affect other constitutional rights and values.  This is a separate inquiry, one which does not 
use only equality as a barometer, but which will also test the impact of the implementation. 
Accordingly, the third Van Heerden criterion, – which requires the measure to promote the 
achievement of equality – needs to include an appreciation of the effect and impact of the 
measure. The impact of a measure is ascertained by looking at how it is implemented.  The 
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within the ambit of the right to and value of equality – of whether the measure ‘serves to 
advance or retard the equal enjoyment in practice of the rights and freedoms that are promised 
by the Constitution but have not already been achieved’.434 
Overall, then this research supports the proportionality standard, in that this standard facilitates 
the degree of justification required of government action which severely impacts on 
fundamental rights.435  Section 36 of the Constitution ‘commits itself to a standard of review 
which requires all rights-limiting measures to be ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.’436  The courts’ 
perspective of section 36 emphasizes that such provides a reasonableness standard 
involving a proportionality requirement.437  The proportionality standard requires that the 
rights- limiting measures be justified by an essential public interest and to be less restrictive 
means to achieve the purpose.438 
The proportionality standard provides the degree of democratic accountability expected of 
rights-limiting measures, whereas the rationality inquiry is not able to realise this.  Given 
that the rationality standard seeks only minimal measure of justification in respects of 
legitimacy of the purposes pursued and means of coherence, it relieves the state of the duty 
to justify its actions 439 by contrast, the proportionality standard makes it a prerequisite for 
the state to account for the prioritisation of public good over a fundamental right in 
each and every circumstances in a legitimate order, that is to say an ‘assessment of the 
nature of the right that is limited, and its importance to an open and democratic society based 
on freedom and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance 
of that purpose to such a society’.440 
Section 36 provides in essence that proportionality is endowed with an analytical structure to 
reveal the state exposition of constitutional justice which inform its decision making.441 
Therefore, this standard matches the ‘service of the democratic values of openness, 
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of the principle of proportionality recommends it as the appropriate standard in terms of which 
account must be given for rights-limiting measures.’443  It is clear that the proportionality 
standard provides a wide-ranging contextual frame of reference for solving rights disputes, as 
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